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Divided Germany and Berlin

by NORMAN J. G. POUNDS

*University Professor of Geography
Indiana University*

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under the general editorship of

GEORGE W. HOFFMAN
University of Texas

G. ETZEL PEARCY
*United States
Department of State*

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Preface

The division of Germany into two—some would say three—parts is a major political problem in the modern world. Designed to serve policy aims that are no longer pursued, it perpetuates a situation that few desire, but which none can agree on altering. The longer the present state of division continues, the more cohesive and distinct will the separate parts become, and the less easily will they again be merged.

The theme of this little book is that the present divided condition of Germany was in fact anticipated during the middle ages and earlier modern times. Then, Germany was politically fragmented a great deal more than it is today, and superimposed upon this division was a contrast in economic growth and social attitudes between the West and the East. The industrial development of Germany during the nineteenth century, which spread a network of roads, railroads and canals over the whole country, overcame these political, economic and social divisions partially. But the accidents of war and the contingencies of politics have revived in an intensified and sharper manner this earlier antithesis of West and East. The present division of Germany is based upon decisions made during and immediately after the Second World War. The delimitation of occupation zones in 1944-45 was hastily conceived, and the creation of an isolated Berlin enclave was, in the light of later developments, an error. But in 1945 the development of the Cold War was only vaguely sensed, and the division of Germany was not expected to last more than a very few years. Today it has all the elements of permanence. This is in part because it underscores a centuries-old contrast within Germany; in part also be-

cause at the end of the war Germany was a *tabula rasa*, upon which new economic systems and new patterns of integration could be created. East and West Germany has each become integrated into its respective sphere, and the task of detaching them and of fusing them together might create more problems than it would solve. At present the re-unification of Germany is not an issue of practical politics, and perhaps it is not even desirable that it should become so in the foreseeable future. This is the argument of this book.

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NORMAN J. G. POUNDS

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IN West Germany a roadside sign which has recently made its appearance shows a map of the boundaries of Germany as they were established in 1919. Conspicuous lines divide the area into three parts, and the slogan, painted beside it, reads "Divided into three—Never!" These words express the feelings of many, perhaps of most Germans toward the present divisions of their country. The reunion of two of the three zones is a political objective of the West German government. No German party could afford to renounce such a policy, and some groups in West Germany call for the reunion of all three. This partition of Germany was the major change brought about in the political map of Europe by the Second World War. It constitutes probably the most important single political problem *within* Central and Western Europe, and this drastic territorial change, made in the interests of peace, may at any time threaten the peace which it was intended to ensure.

The partition of Germany was proposed two years before the end of the Second World War. At the Teheran Conference of the Allied leaders (December, 1943) it was proposed to split Germany into several small territorial units. The British government had already formulated its plan: "... our forces should be disposed in three main zones of roughly equal size, British in the north-west, the Americans in the south and south-west, and the Russians in an eastern zone. Berlin should be a separate joint zone, occupied by each of the three major Allies."¹ France had not been included at this stage. This proposal gained a general acceptance and was elab-

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Cassell and C., London, Vol. VI, p. 443.

orated somewhat farther at the Quebec Conference in September, 1944, when zones of occupation were roughly defined.

All this took place under the pressure of events, when the future outcome of the war could only be surmised. It was unknown whether there would be any kind of German government with which to negotiate, nor how far into Germany each of the Allied armies would be able to penetrate. Was, one may ask, too great a concession made to the Russian point of view in the territorial division of Germany? Could the problem of a divided Germany and of Berlin have been minimized or avoided? The Western Allies undoubtedly stacked the cards against themselves, not because they trusted their Russian ally too much, but because they were not fully aware until it was too late of what they were giving away. On April 18, 1945, Churchill wrote to Truman: "The occupational zones were decided rather hastily at Quebec in September 1944, when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower's armies would make such a mighty inroad into Germany."²


Almost half of prewar Germany was handed over for the Soviet Union and Poland to occupy because the Western Powers were confident that the Russian armies would reach it first anyway. In fact, the advanced elements of Eisenhower's army got to the valley of the Middle Elbe and the Czech cities of Karlovy Vary and Plzeň. They were within 60 miles of Berlin and could have occupied Prague ahead of the Red Army, if their progress had not been restrained by orders from above. Almost half of East Germany was temporarily occupied by Eisenhower's forces, before they were withdrawn to the agreed line of delimitation between the Soviet and its neighboring zones.

In the meanwhile the Polish government had crept up to the line of the rivers Oder and Neisse. In September, 1939, eastern Poland had been annexed to the Soviet Union and as soon as the tide of victory had turned in favor of the Red Army, it was clear that this territory would not be restored to Poland. At the Yalta Conference it was agreed that Poland should be compensated in the west at Germany's expense. The extent of the compensation was left some-

²*Ibid.*, VI, p. 448.

GERMANY TO-DAY

COMPARED *to* PRE-WORLD WAR II AREA



LEGEND

- ...— Boundaries, 1961
- Zonal Boundaries in West Germany
- Territory Lost to Poland
- Territory Lost to U.S.S.R.

(HANKS)

what vague, though there was, it is true, talk at this time of the River Oder as a possible boundary. In the fall and winter of 1944-5, the Red Army swept through these regions, and the agents of the Polish government—the Lublin government—swept in behind it and up to the line of the Western Neisse and lower Oder rivers. At the Potsdam Conference of the Allied leaders (July, 1945), there was a mild protest against this somewhat high-handed action, but it was already a *fait accompli*. Stalin approved it and had probably inspired it, and there was little that could be done.

Thus no less than 45 per cent of the former area of Germany passed, directly or indirectly, under the control of the Soviet Union (Map, p. 3). In the midst of this Soviet-controlled area lay Berlin, the largest city of Germany and former capital of the Reich. Ultimately, it was assumed, the occupation of Germany by Allied forces would come to an end, though on this issue no plan was ever formulated. Berlin would then resume its earlier role as a national capital. In the meanwhile a considerable prestige would attach to the city and its control by the Soviet Union could become the means of political influence. Berlin was too important, despite its ruinous condition, to be left in the exclusive control of one power.

A joint occupation of Berlin by the American, British and Soviet forces had been proposed in 1943, and details of occupation zones were worked out in 1945. Guarantees of freedom of access to the city from the western zones were given by Stalin. But from the start the occupation of Berlin by the Western Powers was precarious. Their entry into the city was delayed by the Russians, and their tenure of the city soon became difficult as the Soviet control over Eastern Germany and over the routes across it gradually tightened.

The German Reich in 1937, that is before the incorporation of Austria, covered an area of 181,630 square miles and had a population of about 66,030,500 (1933 census). Militarily and economically it was the most powerful state in Europe west of the Soviet Union. Its gross national product was exceeded only by those of the United States and of the Soviet Union. After the temporary settlement reached at Potsdam in the summer of 1945, an area of about 82,675 square miles passed directly under Soviet or Polish administration,

and what remained of its German population joined the westward procession of refugees that was making its way toward the blighted and overcrowded lands of western Germany. The remainder of pre-war Germany was now divided into four zones of occupation. The zonal boundaries, roughly delimited at the Quebec Conference, were given their final form (see map 1). France, not previously consulted in this connection, was allocated a zone of occupation in south-west Germany.

The four zones of occupation (and their areas in square miles) were as follows:

American	45,046
Soviet	46,950
British	37,547
French	16,021

In addition, the city of Berlin, set in the Soviet occupation zone 115 miles from the boundary of the British zone, covered 341 square miles.

The Allied Control Council, made up of the commanders of the four occupying armies, was entrusted with the task of ruling Germany. Cooperation between the commanders was difficult to secure, and after 1948 the Allied Control Council ceased to function. Already two complementary trends were apparent in the development of Germany and of allied policies toward Germany. The worsening of relations between the Western powers themselves and the Soviet Union was accompanied by a strengthening of the zonal boundary between the Soviet Zone of Occupation and its neighboring zones to the west. This was not altogether unexpected. A week after the cease-fire had sounded in Germany, before even the zones of occupation had been fully occupied, Churchill in a telegram sent to Truman, declared that "An iron curtain is drawn down upon their (i.e. the Russians') front. We do not know what is going on behind. There seems little doubt that the whole of the regions east of the line Lübeck—Trieste—Corfu will soon be completely in their hands." The iron curtain of which Churchill spoke metaphorically in the summer of 1945 soon became a reality. No boundary in the

world has been more tightly sealed than that between West Germany and the territory of the Soviet bloc.

Concurrent with this strengthening of the zonal boundary between East Germany and the western zones was a weakening of the boundaries between the latter. They never were properly demarcated on the ground, and movement across them was never seriously restricted. In 1948 a central government was established for the three western zones. The rights and duties of the occupying powers were progressively reduced, and the Federal Republic was created in 1949. West Germany ceased to be an "occupied" country, and the Federal German Republic was recognized as sovereign within its own territories in 1955.

The state of war between all the allied powers and Germany was terminated, but a peace conference has never met and a peace treaty has never been drafted. The United States and other western powers are legally correct in their refusal to accept as final the Polish occupation of the lands to the east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, as it was agreed that this should be contingent on a treaty of peace between the victorious powers and Germany. West Germany, in particular, asserts that this area is only temporarily under Polish administration, while the government of East Germany (the Democratic Republic of Germany) has recognized Polish sovereignty over it. The Berlin question is closely bound up with this question of a treaty of peace. The city itself, with its clumsy, quadripartite administrative machinery, its lack of resources for any independent existence and its enormous burden of rebuilding, was never expected to have a separate existence for more than a short period of time. Arrangements for access to the western-held sectors of Berlin lacked the precision which they came later to deserve, because it was never anticipated that a treaty of peace could be so long delayed. Today the Democratic Republic of Germany claims a sovereignty that has been recognized by only a small group of states, including those of the Communist bloc. It claims the right to regulate transit traffic across its territory and subjects the western-held zones of Berlin to an ever present threat to their supply line.

It is easy, with the wisdom that comes with time, to criticize the

settlement reached in 1945. What was not foreseen at this time was the deepening of the suspicion between the Western Allies and the Communist bloc until it reached a state of hostility stopping just short of war. Germany was the first casualty in this struggle. A territorial division that was at first regarded as only temporary has become frozen. Each of the three divisions, ruled by a different government, with its own political and social-economic policy, has gone its own way, or at least the way determined for it by its friends and allies. The boundaries between zones of occupation have become deeply etched into the economy and the society. What were at first merely zones, intended to preserve a balance between the four occupying powers, have become in effect two separate states, oriented in two contrary directions and established on conflicting social-economic bases.

No responsible German would admit, at least in public, that if the boundaries of 1919 could by some miracle be restored, there would be serious problems in knitting the three parts again into a functional whole. But the fact is that neither of them can wipe out the memory of the past fifteen years. A generation is growing up that has no memory at all of the political order that existed before the Second World War, and in only a few years' time, the younger generation will not remember Hitler. To re-unite Germany would be a long, painful and costly process; institutions, social values and even material prosperity in Western Germany might suffer from such a change, which almost every German would advocate.

Four conclusions emerge from this consideration of the political geography of Germany today. The first is the reality and the depth of its division into West and East. Talk of the unification of the two republics, at least on any basis which the Western powers would be prepared to tolerate, is not realistic. Nor from the social and economic points of view would such a unification achieve the ends expected of it. Material conditions, wage scales, capital investment in industry, the structure of agriculture differ too markedly between the two zones for the union of the two republics to be economically feasible without a long period of preparation.

Secondly, the Polish occupation of the lands east of the Oder and

Neisse rivers has every appearance of permanence. The German population has almost entirely migrated to the West and has been replaced by Poles. Agriculture has been partially collectivized. Industry has been expanded and is integrated with that of the rest of Poland. The Polish government regards the Western Territories as an integral part of the Polish state and considers that a peace treaty could do nothing more than formalize an existing situation. Polish sovereignty, as distinct from occupation, of the Western Territories has been recognized by the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Germany, as well as by other members of the Communist bloc and by Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic is emphatic in its refusal to recognize Polish sovereignty over the area. Indeed, with a large proportion of the refugees from that area within its borders and exercising the political rights of citizenship, it really has no alternative. Yet such a policy is not realistic. As long as West Germany and her allies keep the questions of sovereignty over the Western Territories open, Poland has no alternative but to rely on the sanction of Soviet military strength for her continued possession. German reoccupation of these territories is logically possible only after the reunification of the Federal and Democratic Republics, and this is improbable, if not impossible, on conditions acceptable to the West. Reunification on terms approved by the Soviet Union would presumably preclude any alteration of the status of the Polish Western Territories. It seems superfluous to demonstrate that the Soviet Union would not be likely to relinquish its sovereignty over that part of the former German province of East Prussia which it annexed in 1945. Any change in the status of the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line is contingent, then, upon the military defeat of the Soviet Union. While this is inherently possible, the conditions of its accomplishment would probably render superfluous any further consideration of either German reunification or the status of the Polish-held territory.

The third conclusion may amount to little more than a restatement of the argument contained in the previous paragraphs: that any significant change in the boundaries and status of the three major zones into which Germany has been divided is not to be ex-

pected in the foreseeable future. While the policies to which both the Western and the Soviet blocs are at present committed make such changes impossible, it is well within the bounds of possibility that the boundaries between the three divisions themselves may weaken. Such is not the trend at the time of writing, but fluctuations of policy within the broad framework of continuing East-West hostility have been sharp, and may become so again. That trade will continue to be rigidly controlled and conducted on a basis of barter agreements made by the governments is to be assumed. Nevertheless the volume of trade may be stepped up, and with it the degree of interdependence of East and West Germany and Poland. Even here, the present climate of opinion does not warrant any great optimism.

Berlin, lastly, occupies a highly vulnerable position in the center of the Democratic Republic. Its history during the past fifteen years has paralleled closely that of Germany itself. It has come to be divided into Western and Eastern Sectors, each with its own municipal government, separated by a boundary as precisely and as visibly demarcated as the Iron Curtain itself, but at present crossed with somewhat greater ease. Berlin is unlikely, in the near future, at least, to fulfill the function for which it was created and developed, that of being the capital of a united Germany. Yet it was for this reason that the city was accorded its separate status in 1945. One might argue that West Berlin, as an outlier of the German Federal Republic, is being maintained for reasons that have lost their validity, and that a more realistic policy would acquiesce in the merging of all Berlin with the Democratic Republic. Arguments for the retention of this western foothold within the Communist sphere of influence may be summarized in this way. To yield West Berlin in the face of Communist demands and harassment would be an act of appeasement; it would lower the prestige of the anti-Communist world and would encourage the Communists to make fresh and more sweeping demands. At the same time the hopes of the peoples in the so-called captive nations would be disappointed, and they would regard the abandonment of West Berlin as a retreat in the face of Communist pressure. Secondly, the West owes at least a

debt of loyalty to the citizens of West Berlin, who have withstood a war of nerves for over a decade and, lastly, West Berlin served both as an escape hatch for those attempting to leave the Communist sphere and as a listening point through which news of happenings beyond the Iron Curtain could be recorded and transmitted to the West. This role has, however, been gravely impaired by the construction of a wall and other barriers along the East-West sector boundary in August, 1961, and the flow of refugees has been terminated. It is doubtful whether West Berlin has any strategic or military value to the West, and it may be that the city and the supply routes to it are more of a liability than an asset.

The value of West Berlin to the West is in the main a moral one, but whether this moral value is so great as to justify the continued risk of involvement, as a result of maintaining and supplying it, in a war is open to question. The so-called "captive peoples" are not going to revolt, not at least after the events of the fall of 1956, and the abandonment of West Berlin cannot conceivably alter their plight. It can even be argued that the existence of West Berlin as an ever open avenue of escape from East Germany does nothing to ameliorate the lot of the East German, who has, in consequence, a more burdensome police supervision.

To these conclusions regarding the political status and political future of the principle divisions of Germany might be added one regarding the economic level in East and West Germany. The visitor to Berlin cannot help being impressed by the contrast in the outward signs of material prosperity between the Western and the Eastern Zones. East Berlin is, of necessity, the showcase of the Democratic Republic; the contrast between the material conditions in the two German republics is even sharper. The West German economic recovery since about 1948 has been a truly remarkable achievement. This recovery was sparked by the currency reform of 1948; it was encouraged by generous American aid. But it would not have been possible without the natural resources of West Germany and the orderly, disciplined character of its people. Churchill's gloomy prediction of 1945 that the western zones of Germany, without the food-producing provinces of the eastern and of the lands beyond the

Oder-Neisse line, would not be a viable unit, has been proved wrong. West Germany has immense vitality and a balance between agricultural and industrial activity that might be the envy of many another country. Nor is it possible to demonstrate that East Germany is *not* a viable unit. Its lower level of prosperity and welfare reflects not any weakness inherent in East Germany as such, but rather the predatory nature of the Soviet policy toward it.

It is hard to discover any valid reasons, other than those of sentiment, why one should not acquiesce in the indefinite continuance of the boundaries as at present established. But arguments of sentiment are strong. The political unity of Germany is new, and the deeply felt emotions of the German people toward it are proportionate to its newness. To a certain degree German unity was a popular creation, achieved in the face of the vested interests of the German princes. The excesses of the Nazi regime were made possible only by a strong sense of nationhood and coherence. The experience of military defeat in 1918, the overthrow of a regime and a partial occupation by foreign troops did nothing to blunt the edge of German nationalism. They may even have sharpened it. Germany's experience in the Second World War was felt more deeply by more people. The reality of their defeat was brought home to them in a way in which it was not in 1918. Their experiences were in all respects more harrowing, but has all this diminished their will to form a politically united nation? The evidence tends to suggest that it has not, that the memory of an older Germany, distorted maybe by a romantic imagination, extending:

Von der Maas bis an die Memel
Von der Etsch bis an den Belt

is still present among the aspirations of the German people. We can only hope that they are not willing to pay a high price to attain it.

What was that Germany of the pre-war years? What degree of unity had it achieved? How did its parts survive the rude dismemberment of 1945, and by what surgery could they be knit together? This is the subject of this little book.

IN THE course of the past thousand years the boundaries of the German state have changed many times. The area which they have at some time or other embraced may be called the German realm. It stretches from eastern France to Poland and from the Alps to Denmark. It is larger than the two German republics of today and embraces the whole area which the German people have at any time settled in numbers sufficient to leave the imprint of their culture. It is an area of varied relief and great natural beauty. Its climate avoids the extremes of heat and cold and has a sufficient rainfall for its agricultural needs. The soils range in quality from the poor to the richest in Europe, and the endowment of natural resources beneath the soil is generous. This area is drained by rivers wide and deep enough to be navigable for much of their length. In this chapter we shall discuss this physical endowment of the German lands. Those aspects of it will be emphasized which underlie Germany's relations with her neighbors.

REGIONS OF GERMANY³

Along the south the German lands are enclosed by the Alps (Map, p. 13). Today the political boundary stops short along the line of the Bavarian Alps, including within Germany only a narrow strip of high mountain. But German tribes, moving southward into the mountains, had settled a much more extensive area of Alpine territory. Austria, most of which lies within the Alps, is mainly Germanic in its settlement. About two-thirds of Switzerland is German-speak-

³ Relief features, names of regions, rivers, cities, etc. discussed in this chapter are to be found on Maps 3 and 4 and on any regional maps.

ing. Around the southern, or Italian, approach to the Brenner Pass, the lowest and easiest of the regularly used trans-Alpine routes, there lives the German-speaking population of South Tyrol.

North of this Alpine region lies the region of hill, valley and plateau which makes up South Germany. It consists of a series of asymmetrical hill ridges, trending roughly from south-west to north-east. Their westward or north-westward facing slopes are steep, but beyond their summits are gentle surfaces, dipping eastward or south-eastward toward the foot of the next escarpment. The plateau surfaces above the escarpments are generally of limestone; the vales which lie at their foot commonly are floored with clay. The country thus has a striped or banded appearance, giving it variety of relief and soil within a short distance. Within South Germany there are two exceptions to this pattern of land and landscape. To the west is the broad, flat floor of the Rhine valley, flanked on either side by the rounded hills of the Vosges and Black Forest. These latter are made up of rocks older and harder than the limestones, sands and clays which make up most of South Germany. Their soils are poor; their climate, more severe. West of the Vosges a series of scarps and vales, forming a kind of distorted mirror-image of those in South Germany, stretch westward to Paris. Throughout this area there is a kind of banding in the landscape. Hills and valleys lie roughly from north to south or north-east to south-west. Under earlier conditions of transportation and of war, the hill ridges were obstacles to movement and may even have been regarded as strategic barriers. Historical-political maps show many instances of boundaries aligned along their crests. As recently as 1871, the Germans adopted such a political boundary between themselves and France for just such reasons.

The other exception to the prevailing scarp—and—vale topography lies close to the Alpine foothills. Here the rivers, fed by the melting snow and ice during and after the Ice Age, laid down immense quantities of sand, gravel and alluvium, completely hiding the underlying rock. The very extensive spreads of sand and gravel give rise to a very gentle relief but are infertile and, at best, support only forest. The clay areas are poorly drained and merge locally

into swamp. Such are the "Moors" of southern Bavaria, large areas of which have, however, been drained and brought under cultivation.

A third distinctive region of the German realm is made up of the hills, plateaus and narrow valleys which lie in a belt from west to east across the area. In the west they begin in the Ardennes within the borders of France; they continue in the Eifel and the slate plateau which borders the middle course of the Rhine and then, through the hills of Hesse to the Harz Mountains, they span the Thuringian Forest to the diamond-shaped massif of Bohemia. The mountains which enclose this latter area, the Bohemian Forest, Ore Mountains and Giant or Sudeten Mountains, were settled by Germans in the middle ages and remained at least partially German in language until 1945.

In its geological structure this third region of Germany resembles the Black Forest and Vosges. It is made up of rocks of considerable hardness and of great geological age. Over much of the area they have been reduced to a rolling plateau, wetter than the surrounding lowlands and high enough to have a raw, cool climate. Across this region the rivers, notably the Rhine and its tributaries, the Mosel and the Lahn, and the headwaters of the Weser flow sometimes in deep, narrow valleys; sometimes across broad, open basins excavated in areas of softer rock.

These central uplands of Germany drop sharply to the northern plain. This is the most important and the least attractive part of Germany. Along its southern margin lies a high percentage of the agricultural land, most of the coal and iron ore, the majority of the industrial cities and the larger part of the population. Despite the generally low relief, the northern plain is a region of great variety. Like the plateau of Bavaria, much of it is covered by deposits either left behind by the ice or washed out from the retreating margin of the ice-sheet. The salient features of the plain are ridges, somewhat curving in form and made up of glacial gravels and sands. These ridges, in general, mark stages in the retreat of the ice-sheet. Along their outer, that is their southern, edge are banks of sterile sand and gravel. Within their curving line is usually clay, irregularly deposited by the ice as it melted quickly away.

Most conspicuous of the sand-gravel ridges is the Lüneburg Heath, between the courses of the lower Weser and lower Elbe. Beyond the middle Elbe, it continues in the Fläming and Lausitz Heaths of East Germany and so into Poland. At its highest and broadest, between Hamburg and Hannover, it is a sterile area that never attracted many settlers. Its natural vegetation is an association of low-growing heath plants, but in recent years large areas have been afforested with conifers.

Outside or south of the heathlands of North Germany, damp alluvial valleys and clay plains, partly glacial in origin, stretch southward towards the central uplands. Near the junction of the two, where the land surface begins to rise out of the damp northern plain and where the glacial deposits begin to wear thin, is one of the most important and productive regions of Germany. In this rolling country, which is neither entirely hill nor entirely plain, a dust-like deposit was laid down during and after the Ice Age. This loess deposit varies in depth. It is light and porous, well-drained and easy to cultivate. Its natural vegetation was an open woodland, cleared more easily by primitive man than either the heavy glacial clays or the forested hills. With a high natural fertility it combined a dryness that made it easy to traverse. Quite early in human history a routeway for commerce and for human migration was opened up from west to east along this belt of loess. Here were some of the earliest agricultural settlements, and here too, in early Germany, trading cities lay thicker on the ground than anywhere else.

North of the curving line of moraine is the undulating clay plain that makes up much of eastern Schleswig, Holstein, Mecklenburg and Pomerania (Pommern). Its soils, derived from boulder clay, are damp and heavy. The region was originally one of oak forest, which has mostly been cleared to make way for meadow. It is good dairy country; fodder crops grow well, but it is not on the whole good land for grain crops.

It is of great importance to see how these types of landscape and soil are combined in the plains of East Germany and of the area now held by Poland. The German East, it has been claimed, is the

food-growing area of Germany; to separate it from the industrial West would be the height of folly, because the two parts of Germany are complementary and necessary for one another. In April 1945 Churchill wrote to Truman: "As it stands at present the Russian occupational zone has the smallest proportion of people and grows by far the largest proportion of food, the Americans have a not very satisfactory proportion of food to conquered population, and we poor British are to take over all the ruined Ruhr and large manufacturing districts, which are, like ourselves, in normal times large importers of food. . . . The Russian idea of taking these immense food supplies out of the food-producing areas of Germany to feed themselves is very natural, but I contend that the feeding of the German population must be treated as a whole and that the available supplies must be divided pro rata between the occupational zones."⁴ Churchill, like many others, regarded the eastern part of this North German Plain as the breadbasket of Germany. In this he was wrong. This region was characterized by the great estates of the German aristocracy. But a big estate is not necessarily a good means of raising food. Furthermore, much of this area was incapable of raising much food in any case. The landforms and the soil types, alternating sandy moraine and outwash and heavy, ill-drained clay-lands reach eastward across East Germany into Poland. It is true that there were relatively few mouths to feed in much of this area, but on the other hand little food was produced from many parts of it. Only in the loess area to the south are there extensive areas of good cropland. Eastern Germany has always supplied Berlin and the cities of the east with those food products which it was climatically suited to produce; it has never been an important source of foodstuffs for West Germany.

SOILS AND HUMAN SETTLEMENT

In the course of human settlement in the German lands, the better soils were first cleared of their woodland cover and occupied by man. Only after these had been exhausted, at least within the limits of the techniques available to primitive man, were inroads

⁴Op. cit., pp. 448-449.

made upon areas of poorer or less tractable soils. There was a progressive broadening of the area under settlement and cultivation, until its maximum extent was reached during the nineteenth century. Since that date there has been some retreat in the frontier of settlement. Marginal lands, brought under cultivation during the later middle ages and early modern times, were to some slight degree allowed to pass back to the waste.

The area, extent and location of the early, that is pre-medieval, clearing and settlement is important not merely because it identifies the area of greatest agricultural productivity, but also because it marks out the focal areas in the spread of German culture. It was from such focal areas that the early German state derived both the manpower and the material resources to carry out its schemes of conquest. Here were the seats of the early rulers and of leading members of the nobility, and here was to be found the heart of the state, that part without which the state could not function as a cohesive whole. The German mind likes to go back into its misty past, and it derives considerable satisfaction from its highly romanticized folklore and legend. Such tales are a part of the German culture, of the cement which binds the German people into the German nation. The locale of German heroic legend has, at least since the time of J. G. Herder in the late eighteenth century, exercised a strange fascination over the German mind. This phenomenon is far from unique. The Serbs look to their Raška, the Swiss to the Forest Cantons, the Poles to Wielkopolska as the anvils on which their nations were forged by the contingencies of history.

By and large the German hearth or core-area is made up of those regions of light soil, which could be easily cleared of their woodland cover with primitive tools. Broadly speaking, there are three such areas. One occupies the plain of the middle Rhineland. At its center is today the city of Mainz. It reaches south approximately to Speyer, south of which gravels and marshy alluvium precluded early settlement. A similar area occupied the Cologne "Bay," from Bonn to Düsseldorf, shut in by the Rhineland plateau on west and east and on the north by the damper, heavier land which reaches to the Netherlands' border. A third and very much more extensive area

lies in Saxony. On the south it is enclosed by the Thuringian Forest and Ore Mountains, on the east and north by the marshes and sterile sands and gravels left in the wake of the retreating ice. It almost envelops the Harz Mountains and extends westward to Hannover. Between and around each of these areas were smaller patches of land, cleared and settled at an early date. Some of these, such as the early clearings in Swabia and along the Main and Neckar valleys, ultimately coalesced. Elsewhere these small areas of primitive settlement remained detached, without the power to influence greatly the stream of German history.

Between these areas of early settlement was forest. A continuous forest cover remained, long after the middle ages had ended, over the Harz Mountains, the Thuringian Forest, the Rhineland Plateau, the Spessart, Odenwald and Black Forest. These forested areas broke early Germany into compartments between which communications were, of course, maintained, but always with a degree of difficulty. The more westerly areas which were cleared and settled at an early date became, in general, the core-areas of the later tribal duchies of the middle ages. In these areas, at Cologne, Mainz, Speyer and Worms, the later medieval diets met. If Germany had at this time been a unified state it is probable that its capital would have been here, perhaps in Frankfurt.

But German settlement and civilization were at this time spreading eastwards. Cities were established beyond the Elbe and then beyond the Oder. Upper Saxony emerged in the sixteenth century as a new focal area. It was the home of Luther and the cradle of the German Reformation, and its dialect, into which Luther translated the Bible, became the standard German language. But beyond the Elbe there were no large areas of early human settlement characterized by that kind of social maturity that was found in the central Rhineland. Indeed, there were few extensive areas of good soils to be found. German settlement here assumed a somewhat different character. The large, compact West German village, the thick scatter of market cities with their developing middle class of traders and craftsmen and their incipient trade, gave place to large estates with an economic organization that was more self-

sufficing, with long-distance trade limited to such primary products as lumber, skins, hides and salt.

Material welfare east of the Elbe was in keeping with the sterility and poverty of much of its soils. However it is regarded, whether from the point of view of literature, architecture or urban development, the German East was always poorer than the areas of older settlement in the West. The East was more feudal than the West or, rather, was the area where a feudal structure of society lasted longest. This important factor in the development of the German lands derives largely from the basic differences in the human habitat. West Germany lay, it is true, closer to the frontier of the Roman Empire. It was nearer to the centers of Christianity, culture and commerce in the Western Mediterranean basin, from which, it is usually argued, the civilizing and urbanizing influences spread eastward. West Germany received the spirit of western civilization earlier than the East, and experienced it more deeply.

The relevance of this discussion of the focal or core-areas of German civilization and of the contrast between the eastern and the western parts of the German settlement area will become more apparent in the next chapter.

RIVERS AND CANALS

The German realm is drained in part by the Danube and its tributaries; in part by rivers flowing north to the North and Baltic Seas. The Danube rises in the Black Forest, flows across the scarp-lands and the plateau of southern Bavaria and enters Austria. The river itself is navigable from near Regensburg in Bavaria to the point where it enters the Black Sea. Down the Danube valley, between the hills of Bohemia to the north and the Alps, German settlers passed to settle the German Ostmark, or Austria. The river, flowing east through the lands of the Hapsburgs and into those that once were ruled by the Turks, has also helped to turn the imagination of Germans in this direction. They aspired to build a commercial empire in the Balkans and the Middle East based on a railroad that would reach through Turkey to the shores of the Indian Ocean. Yet today the Danube is little used. At the boundary

between Austria and Hungary it crosses the Iron Curtain. Lower down it flows across the north-eastern part of Yugoslavia, and along its lower course it forms the boundary between Rumania and Bulgaria. Hostility between the states through which it flows has always kept the volume of traffic on the Danube at a low level, and today the fact that any long distance trade on the river would be between the non-Communist and Communist worlds has further restricted it. To these political difficulties are added those of a more physical order. The Danube is not easily navigated. The shallows in its course through Hungary and the rapids where it crosses the line of the Carpathian mountains all form obstacles. The upper river is swift, especially in summer, when the melting snows of the Alps combine with the heavy rains of Central Europe to raise the level of the water to a point which makes navigation almost impossible. In winter ice forms on the river and constitutes a hazard of a different order. Nevertheless, the dams now being constructed in the Austrian section of the river will improve the physical conditions of navigation. A navigable Danube is of little use to Germany without a water connection with the Rhine and that, on a scale that would permit the use of modern barges, does not yet exist. The Danube, lastly, flows from a higher developed, highly industrialized country, through several countries each with a moderate degree of development in these respects, into an area—South-eastern Europe—which is still among the least developed on the continent. Trade between the two poles of the Danubian axis would necessarily be in large measure the exchange of industrial products for the products of forest, field and mine. Such an exchange was the object of Germany's agreements, negotiated by its finance minister, Hjalmar Schacht, during the 1930's.

The rest of Germany is drained northward to the North and Baltic Seas. The Rhine, Elbe and Oder rise to the south and enter Germany as developed and, in varying degrees, navigable rivers. Of the larger rivers, only the Weser rises within Germany.

The Rhine, most famous and most important of the rivers of Germany and even of Europe, rises in Switzerland, and its highest river-port, the city of Basel, lies just within the Swiss boundary.

From Basel to a point a few miles below Mainz, the Rhine flows northward across its plain, with the Vosges and the Black Forest dimly visible away to the west and east. This has always been one of the most intensively used sections of the river. From the Roman times onward it has borne northward the products of Italy. Early in the nineteenth century the winding course of the river was straightened and regulated. River-ports were established on both banks; Mainz, Ludwigshafen and Strasbourg on the west; Mannheim and Kehl on the east.

Below Mainz the Rhine enters the series of gorges by which it crosses the Rhineland Plateau. These have always constituted the most picturesque section of the river's course, and the tourist who sails from Cologne or Düsseldorf up to Mainz and back again and watches the smooth operation of this, the most intensively used river in the world, can form no idea of the earlier hazards of navigation.

Near Bonn the Rhine enters the northern plain, across which it flows, passing the mouth of the Ruhr and crossing the western extension of the Ruhr coalfield until it enters the Netherlands and discharges into the North Sea.

The Rhine was a commercial highway long before the coalfield of the Ruhr was discovered and its industries built up. But the Ruhr industrial region has added immeasurably to the traffic carried by the river. Fuel and other materials distributed by river from the Ruhr port of Duisburg-Ruhrort are used in chemical industries as far upstream as Basel. The import of iron ore, of lumber and even of grain and the export of Ruhr coal form a large part of the commercial activities of the port of Rotterdam.

Navigable tributaries, the Main and Neckar, extend the range of the navigable system of the Rhine. The idea of linking the Rhine and Danube waterways by means of a canal cut to join their tributaries is far from new. The Ludwigs Canal was constructed through the Swabian Jura in the nineteenth century. It is small and of little use today, but there are plans to replace it by a larger waterway that would permit barge traffic right from industrial north-west Germany to Austria and beyond.

The economic empire of Germany over the Danubian and South-east European lands was never a reality for a period of more than a few years, and its revival in the near future does not lie within the sphere of practical politics. This, however, cannot be said of the relations between the Rhineland and its neighbors to the west. The only important left bank tributary is the Mosel (*French*: Moselle), which rises on the western flank of the Vosges, traverses Lorraine and reaches the Rhine at Koblenz by means of a deeply incised and acutely meandering valley. In its natural state the Mosel was no more a navigable river than the right-bank tributaries of the Rhine had been, but like the latter it could be regulated and made navigable without great difficulty. The fact that the Mosel had not been so trained was explicable largely by the fact that French or German interests—usually the latter—were opposed for political reasons to its canalization. The motivation on each side in this question will be discussed later.

The rest of Germany is drained by three major river systems, all of them flowing northward: the Weser, Elbe and Oder. The Weser rises amid the hills of Central Germany and pursues an angular course, in the lower part of which it is joined by the Aller. Below this point it passes the city of Bremen, widens into its estuary and thus reaches the North Sea.

In its general alignment the Elbe resembles the Weser. It rises in the hill country of southern Bohemia, crosses the Ore Mountains by a narrow valley of great beauty and enters the northern plain near Dresden. Its course is mainly north-westward. At Hamburg it enters its long, narrow estuary, and 60 miles farther to the north-west it enters the North Sea. The Elbe receives a number of tributaries, but its most important is unquestionably the Havel, which, with its tributary the Spree, drains the marshy, lake-studded depression which lies between the younger end moraine of Mecklenburg and the older end moraine which supports the Fläming Heath. The immense significance of this small, infertile and forested area, the Havelland and Spreewald, will be discussed later. Let it suffice to note here that in it lie Brandenburg, Potsdam and Berlin.

The Oder rises in the Czechoslovak province of Moravia, but

within a few miles of its source it enters the former German and now Polish province of Silesia. Its direction here conforms with that which, we have already seen, is common to the rivers of the North German Plain. For more than half its distance to the sea the Oder flows toward the northwest, but near the confluence of the River Neisse, the Oder changes its direction and flows roughly north to the Stettin Lagoon—Stettiner Haff (Szczecin)—and so to the sea.


What might well appear to be an excessive attention has been given to the rivers of the North German Plain because their alignment, their direction and the possibility of their interconnection by means of canals have been facts of great economic and political significance. These rivers, at least in those sections of their courses which lie within the northern plain, occupy depressions formed by melt-water as it escaped from the retreating ice during the Great Ice Age. The glacial retreat was temporarily halted on a number of occasions. A bank of morainic material accumulated along the margin of the ice, and the melt-water, taking, in Germany at least, a north-westward course to the sea, created the broad, shallow and rather marshy depressions which have already been noted as characteristic of the plain. One such depression extends down the valley of the upper Elbe from below Dresden to Magdeburg, then across to the valley of the Aller and so down the lower Weser to the sea. Parallel to this depression and north-east of it is another extending from the Upper Oder valley along the Spree and Havel to the lower Elbe. The barriers between each of these valleys are low, irregular and were probably breached even during the period of their formation by transverse valleys or depressions.

Two consequences arise from this rectilinear pattern of drainage. In the first place, the general trend of the rivers is from south-east to north-west. Most of the area of German settlement is drained to the North Sea. The hinterlands of the German North Sea ports of Bremen and Hamburg, as defined by the drainage systems that converge on them, embrace a large part of North Germany.

Secondly, this hinterland is artificially extended by the construction of canals along the great valleys. In no instance does a single

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CITIES and INDUSTRIAL AREAS



river occupy the whole of one of these valleys, but between the segments of the several rivers that do, there are low-lying marshy tracts which provide almost ideal physical conditions for the cutting of canals. Thus the Ems is joined to the Weser; the Aller is joined to the Elbe; the Spree and Havel to the Oder; the Warta and Noteć to the Vistula. It is thus possible, theoretically at least, to take a very small barge from the Rhine mouth at Rotterdam all the way to the Russian boundary at Brest Litovsk.

A waterway almost as long as that which links the industrial Rhineland, by way of the Main, Altmühl and Danube, with the Balkans joins up the Rhine with the farthest limits of present-day Poland. Neither of these great waterway systems functions as a unit. Dimensions of the waterway are not consistent, and political obstacles are too great at present to allow the purely physical obstacles to be surmounted. But the waterways are there; the maps show them, as indeed they have shown waterways along these routes now for several generations. Plans and hopes of making the remote areas of eastern Poland and the lower Danube economically dependent upon the commercial ports, the coalfields and the industries of Northwest Germany receive a certain encouragement from the map.

Only one navigational system can be said to have been completed, the Mittelland Canal which, with its tributary canals, the Herne and the Dortmund-Ems Canal in the west and the complex system of canals and canalized rivers which encloses Berlin in the east, joins the Rhine with the Oder. This waterway system is intensively used, more especially in its western parts, where it is tributary to the Ruhr industrial area, and around Berlin. It facilitates the movement of bulk cargoes, especially coal and petroleum, iron-ore, lumber, bricks, lime, cement and sand. Many are the factories that have been built on or close to it, from steelworks in Dortmund to the Volkswagen works at Wolfsburg. Berlin derived much of its fuel from the Ruhr by way of the Mittelland Canal, and the canal and its tributary waterways link the northern ports with the cities that have grown up along the southern margin of the plain.

MINERAL RESOURCES

Germany, both East and West, is a great industrial country (Map, p. 25), and this industrial pre-eminence is based in part on the excellence and abundance of German resources in coal and in part on other natural resources. German capacity for work and German powers of organization might not have been wholly effective without these other resources.

COALFIELDS AND FUEL RESOURCES

Along the northern edge of the highlands of Central Germany, at the junction of hill and plain, is a line of coalfields. These begin in the west in the small Aachen coal field. A barren area separates the Aachen field from that of the Ruhr, one of the largest in terms of resources and best in terms of quality among the coal basins of the world. The Ruhr coalfield is about 70 miles from west to east. Its southern edge is sharply defined, and from this line the coal seams dip northward, beneath the alluvium of the Emscher valley, beneath the Secondary beds which underlie the North German Plain and beneath the glacial deposits which cover its surface. They are now mined as far north as Münster from a depth of about 3500 feet below the surface of the ground. How much farther north mining will be extended depends, on the one hand, on the future demand for solid fuels and, on the other, on the advance of mining technology.

The importance of the Ruhr coalfield cannot be exaggerated in the shaping both of German political policy and of the policy of Germany's neighbors toward her. The Ruhr coalfield is unique among European coalfields in that it abuts directly on the superb navigable waterway of the Rhine and in having at its back door, as it were, the physical conditions that made possible the construction of the system of waterways that has already been described. The Ruhr coals range in quality from the anthracitic "lean" coals in the lowest part of the coal series, to flame and gas coals in the upper. Near the middle of the series are the most extensive reserve in Eu-

rope of coking coal, that is of coal capable of yielding a metallurgical coke for the blast furnace. It is this latter coal, which occurs in only small quantities in all other European countries with the exceptions of the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia, which gives to the Ruhr its peculiar value. It is used in the large and important iron smelting industry which its presence attracted to the Ruhr area. It supplies the coke requirements of Luxembourg and is important in the metallurgical industries of the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Austria and Italy. French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, Allied control of the area after the Second World War and the French proposal of a European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 were all related to the fact that in the Ruhr area lies a very large proportion of Europe's coals with a volatile content which makes them suitable for the manufacture of metallurgical coke.

East of the Ruhr coalfield the remaining German coalfields are small in area, poor in resources and of little more than local significance. They occur near Hannover and again near Leipzig and Chemnitz in Upper Saxony. Beyond the boundary of present day Germany are the small coalfield of Lower Silesia and the large coalfield of Upper Silesia, both of which now lie within the boundary of Poland. In terms of reserves the latter rivals the Ruhr itself, but most of the coal has too high a volatile content to be considered true coking coal. A shortage of good quality metallurgical coke has since the late nineteenth century restricted the smelting industry, and today Poland, while on balance a large coal exporter, is partially dependent on imports of coking coal.

One important coalfield lies to the south of the main coal-bearing belt. This is the small coal basin of the Saar. Its resources are not large, and they do not include the vitally important coking coal. Nevertheless, they lie on the western border of the German language area, and France has been at times so short of coal that even the Saar coal was important.

In addition to the reserves of bituminous coal Germany also possesses large deposits of brown coal. This is of a younger geological age than bituminous. Its calorific value is low, and it is not valuable enough to bear the cost of distant transport. On the other

hand, it normally occurs close to the surface of the ground and can usually be strip-mined at a relatively low cost. It is not usually transported far from the pits where it is obtained. Usually it is passed through a press to extract the large amount of water contained in it, and much of it is then burned in adjoining thermal-electric generators. The largest and most important brown coal deposits are in the west, between Cologne and Aachen, in Upper Saxony, near Halle, and to the east of the Oder. In the west, the brown coal of the lower Rhineland is in direct competition with the incomparably better coal of the Ruhr and Aachen fields, and little of it is ever transported out of the complex of mines, generators and factories where it is produced. But in Saxony and beyond the Oder bituminous coal is less plentiful, and the creation of the boundary between West and East Germany reduces the supply to the East of bituminous coal from the Ruhr. Brown coal has for over half a century been much more important east of the Elbe than it is ever likely to be to the West. Political considerations and a degree of enforced self-sufficiency have increased its importance.

Petroleum is obtained from a few localities in North Germany and also in Bavaria, and the volume obtained goes some way to relieve Germany's overwhelming dependence upon imports. During the Second World War the problem of Germany's supply of liquid fuel was solved, partially at least, by the manufacture of synthetic oils from coal in a number of plants built for this purpose in the Ruhr area. These works were severely damaged during the war and some have not been rebuilt. The domestic production of petroleum is supplemented by imports, which account for about 70 per cent of total consumption. A large part of the refining capacity of West Germany is in the northern ports of Bremen and Hamburg and on the Rhine, where the refineries can be served by water transportation. Pipelines are now being built which will distribute petroleum to the West European countries from the ports near Marseilles and Rotterdam. This pipeline is planned to parallel the river Rhine from Cologne to Basel, and to supply refineries along the waterway.

East Germany also obtains some petroleum from its own small oilfields but is overwhelmingly dependent on imports from its

allies in the Communist bloc. A pipeline from the Soviet Union is now being built across Poland to the East German border at Frankfurt-on-Oder. The example provided by the supply of petroleum to the two parts of present-day Germany shows very clearly how each is being integrated with the economy of its allies, and how foolish it now is to speak of the functional unity of Germany.

METALLIFEROUS ORES

In sharp contrast with Germany's abundant coal resources is her poverty in all metalliferous deposits. Germany was a pioneer in mining, but her reputation was based on small reserves of high grade ores. Most of the iron mines of the Siegerland are closed. Silver and lead mining have almost been abandoned in the Harz Mountains, and the Ore Mountains, at least on the German side of the boundary, no longer justify their name. Of the metalliferous ores, those of iron are unquestionably the most important. Germany's reserves are large, but almost all are low grade and highly siliceous. They occur in the northern plain, particularly near Hannover and Braunschweig. They were used in the nineteenth century, and their exploitation was stepped up under the autarchic policy of the Nazis. The Salzgitter iron and steel works, which they built to smelt the local ores, is now again in production. But the ore deposits of the Ruhr have long since been exhausted. The smelting industry still clings to the coalfield and uses ores imported in part from the ore field of Lower Saxony but mainly from overseas sources of supply. Sweden has long been the most important source. Its high-grade ores, with an average 60 per cent metal content, are brought by sea to the ports of Rotterdam and Emden and then shipped by barge to the Ruhr. Swedish ore is supplemented by that from Brazil, Canada, and elsewhere. Approximately 52 per cent of the gross tonnage of iron ore used in West Germany is from domestic sources; the rest is imported. In terms of metal content the picture is rather less favorable, as the imported ore is a great deal richer than the domestic. It is noteworthy that Lorraine figures only inconspicuously among the sources of Germany's imports of iron ore. Political and technical considerations have prevented the development of a close relation-

ship between the biggest of Europe's coalfields and the most considerable of Europe's iron ore reserves. The Lorraine iron-smelting and steel industry has not been able to escape a partial dependence on the Ruhr for its fuel supply, but any movement of Lorraine ore to the Ruhr is entirely incidental. To some extent this is because the Lorraine ore, of a low grade like that of Salzgitter, does not justify a long rail haul; to some degree also because, for political reasons, the German smelting industry was not prepared to become dependent on France, when alternative sources were available, for an essential raw material. Today the Common Market and the canalized Mosel promise to remove both the political and the cost objections to an integration of the Ruhr and Lorraine. But established industrial patterns are not easy to change. In addition to a human reluctance to change a pattern of doing business there is also the technological factor. The Ruhr industry is geared to ores other than those of Lorraine.

East Germany has only small reserves of iron ore, and those mainly of low quality. The smelting industry was always less developed here than in the West, and previous to the Second World War one might have said that there was no effective iron and steel industry between the twin poles of the Ruhr and Upper Silesia. Today a steel industry is being developed in the Democratic Republic, and the local ores, exploited to the full, are being supplemented by imports.

Such is the land within which the Germanic tribes settled during the early centuries of the Christian era and through which they spread their language and culture. That the land itself, its relief, soils and drainage, influenced this settlement and the patterns of relationship between human groups, has been strongly suggested. The natural divisions of Germany intensified, if they did not cause, the contrasts in the historical development and in the variations in human organization of the land. In spite of these divisions, and perhaps because of them, an important line of thinking in Germany has seen in the German lands a natural geographic unity which transcends the accidents of relief and drainage. "Germany," wrote Albrecht Penck. "is for us a natural unity and not simply a political

conception. . . . Germany . . . is . . . not the land in which German only is spoken. It stretches from earliest times beyond the limits of German speech . . . (it) is a definite part of the earth's surface with characteristic features and a distinct form."⁵

Partsch defined in more precise geographical terms the limits of Central Europe, which he equated with the German realm. "The threefold belt of Alps, inferior chains (i.e., the Scarplands and Central Uplands) and northern lowlands, controls the landscape and scenery of Central Europe. Wherever one of these elements dies out, Central Europe comes to an end. Its most westerly point is therefore marked by the western end of the great lowland at Dunkirk, and the landmark of its eastern border is the Polish upland at Sandomierz."⁶ This idea of the "natural" unity of the German lands is far from new. It was expressed by Herder in the eighteenth century and was to some extent a reaction against the political fragmentation of Germany itself. But this mystical identification of people and land, of *Volk und Boden*, certainly went far beyond any reasonable limits in its protest against the political division of the German-settled area. It was given a philosophical foundation by J. G. Fichte at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and it continued to influence German thought and perhaps also German action until the time of Hitler. Fichte's claim, made in his "Addresses to the German Nation" in 1807, that the German state should embrace all areas in which the German language is spoken, came to be accepted and even, in fact, enlarged upon. The Germany of the future should embrace all parts of Central Europe in which the German culture has in any way set its mark. Such an area, from the Low Countries in the West to Rumania in the East, from northern Italy to Denmark "is like a sea in which all kinds of fish disport themselves. And nowhere are limits or divisions sharply fixed. . . . To reduce this crowd to political efficiency, to produce from it an army and to make it a vigorous, united, organic State

⁵ Albrecht Penck, "Deutschland als Geographische Gestalt" (Germany as Geographic Unit), as quoted by R. E. Dickinson, *The German Lebensraum*, Penguin Books, London, 1943, p. 117.

⁶ Joseph Partsch, *Central Europe*, Heinemann and Co., London, 1903, pp. 2-3.

—this is something almost superhuman and at the same time splendid, a task for the ablest of statesmen, who possess the soul of the nations, and whose thoughts are guided by the spirit of history.”⁷ The rash endeavor to give political unity to the German lands, to create a unified German state will occupy the next chapter.


⁷ Friedrich Naumann, *Central Europe*, trans. C. M. Meredith, P. S. King and Son, London, 1916, p. 65.

GERMANS today look back to the Germany of the years between the First and Second World Wars. It is the boundaries established by the Treaty of Versailles (June, 1919) and by decisions that derived their sanction from it that, they claim, they desire to re-establish. Yet a generation ago Germans looked back with a similar nostalgia to the boundaries of 1914, which were trimmed so drastically in the Paris settlement. The German Federal and Democratic Republics have together an area of 145,905 square miles. The Germany that remained after the implementation of the Versailles Treaty covered 180,630 square miles, an area almost one third greater. And the Germany that made war in 1914 was even larger, with 208,780 square miles. This progressive reduction of the total area of Germany—not to mention the loss of overseas possessions—requires careful examination. But before we discuss this progressive dismemberment of Germany we must look briefly at its expansion during the preceding centuries (Map, p. 35).

Germany, as a politically unitary state, dates only from 1871, when the German Empire was established and Wilhelm, King of Prussia, was proclaimed Kaiser Wilhelm I. Before this date, Germany had been a congeries of small states, with a quasi-federal structure but lacking an effective central administration. Even earlier than this a symbolic unity had been given to Germany by the institution of the Holy Roman Empire. The Emperor, chosen from among the body of German princes, wielded a power that was proportionate only to his personal possessions. The title became a vain pretention, and from 1273, when it became in effect hereditary in

GERMANY

During MIDDLE AGES and MODERN TIMES



LEGEND

- 1961 Germany
- Territory Lost by Germany, 1919-1921
- Boundary Established, 1919-1921
- Boundary of German Empire, 1871-1918
- German Confederation, 1815-1866
- German Empire, 1378
- German Empire, Late 12th Century

the Hapsburg family, the Emperors almost ignored the land to which they owed their imperial title.

Germany was thus late in achieving political unity, and until 1871 it was little more than a geographical expression. This late political maturing, in contrast with the early development of German genius in other creative fields such as the arts and technology, was not altogether the fault of the Germans themselves. Still less can the blame be laid at the door of their geography. It was, like every event of major importance in human history, contingent upon happenings inconspicuous and little regarded at the time: the interplay of personalities, ambitions too big to be supported by the resources of a petty German state, the lure of Italian conquest and the sacrifice of national aspirations for dynastic and family ends; all these help to explain the German tragedy. Why France and even Poland should have attained political unity and some kind of a centralized political system before the middle ages were over, while Germany at the same time was disintegrating into a medley of little states too small and vulnerable for complete independence, too autocratic to form a federation, too selfish to visualize a Germany bigger than themselves, was perhaps the greatest tragedy of modern European history. In the long run it proved impossible to hold back the aspirations of German nationalism. The German Empire appeared late on the political map of Europe. The freshness and brashness was wearing off from the nation-states of Western Europe when Bismarck launched the German nation into statehood.

THE GERMAN TRIBES

The German tribes came into the light of history out of the forests of Scandinavia and the Baltic coast. What their migrations were and where they settled would be unimportant questions, from any pragmatic point of view, if they were not being given a political significance in Germany today.

In early historical times the Germanic peoples were settled from the Rhine to the Elbe, very roughly in that area which today comprises the Federal German Republic. From here they spread south into the Alps; some of their number penetrated and settled north-

ern Italy. They crossed the Rhine in the 5th century A.D., spread through the territory of the Low Countries, settled Alsace and part of Lorraine and gave the name of one of their tribes, the Franks, to the kingdom of France itself. The most advanced wave of the German invaders spread far beyond the limits sketched here. The Visigoths established a kingdom in north-east Spain and southern France which lasted until it was overthrown by the Arabs in the 8th century. In the ancestry of many a Gascon or Provençal or Catalan is a warrior of one of the German tribes. But culturally this German element has been wholly suppressed. The limit of German westward settlement, in so far as we can trace it today, is the western limit of German speech. This line has shown a remarkable stability for close to a thousand years, though in the north the Low German speech has ripened into the Flemish-Dutch language, and in a few localities French has in recent years gained at the expense of German.

The most continuous and pervasive movement of the Germanic peoples, however, was eastward into the lands beyond the Elbe and the Oder rivers. This movement has been exaggerated by some German writers into a dominant theme, a sort of *Leitmotif* in German history. Recent generations have been taught to think in terms of Germany's civilizing mission in the East and of a German realm covering most of East-Central Europe. Such claims are not stressed today, but Germany's eastern neighbors cannot help fearing that they may be revived and again be implemented as they were by Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Hitler.

The German "Push to the East" (*Drang nach der Osten*) was not quite what the romantic German imagination would have us believe it was. It was a piecemeal affair. Germans from the Rhineland and other parts of West Germany moved into the half-empty lands of the east. They came in small groups. There was little co-ordination and no long-term policy. They did not regard themselves as entrusted with a mission or as a civilizing force. They were poor and hungry for land and status, so they moved east into the expanding "Frontier" of medieval Europe. This eastward spread of settlers was, of course, accompanied by an extension of political and eccles-


istical authority and by the spread of German concepts of society and law, of German systems of agriculture and methods of trade. Cities were established in the Slav lands often enough according to the "laws" or customs current in the German city of Magdeburg.

It is difficult to separate the spread of German people from that of institutions of German origin. The Germans did not expand into an empty land. Their "East" was far more populous and economically far more developed than our "West." Germans took over Slav settlements and imposed German "laws" on Slav cities. They absorbed Slavs into their own culture. With the centuries this policy of eastward expansion and of cultural Germanization became more self-conscious. The concepts of modern nationalism were foreign to the early German settlers in the east. Frederick the Great, however, scattered German settlements over Silesia in order to Germanize the Poles who lived in this area. In the 1880's Bismarck conducted a campaign against the culture of the Slav population living within the limits of the German Empire, and during the Second World War Hitler attempted to destroy it.

The eastward movement of German settlers was so vigorous that it outran the authority of the German state. By the end of the middle ages the boundary of the area of compact Germanic settlement was approximately that shown in Map 5. It included East Prussia, much of Pomerania and part of Silesia, and it intruded into Bohemia. Austria, the Ostmark of medieval Germany, was German in culture, and the German-settled area extended south of the Alpine divide into the South Tyrol. Out beyond the main area of German settlement lay islands of German culture. Through the Baltic provinces a German minority wielded spiritual and secular power. Compact, isolated groups were to be found through the Carpathian Mountains, over the Hungarian Plain and in Southeastern Europe.

During the later years of the 19th century the policy of Germanization in the previously Slav lands ran into increasing difficulties. A Slav consciousness had reached the point at which it was able to make a determined stand against the encroachment of the German language and of German cultural traits. Bismarck was not the unqualified victor in his struggle against the Poles of eastern Germany.

The GERMAN Settlement Area



The German impetus was running down when the First World War, the defeat of Germany and the resurgence of the Slav states put it into reverse.

THE MEDIEVAL EMPIRE

German political authority had followed somewhat haltingly in the wake of the advance of German culture. The limits of the medieval German Empire were somewhat indeterminate. They fluctuated in the west for local and dynastic reasons. In the east they included Bohemia, but whether they ever included Poland as well depends entirely on the construction put upon certain ceremonial and symbolic acts in the earlier middle ages. The Low Countries and much of eastern France, including Lorraine, Alsace and Burgundy, were part of the medieval German Empire. It embraced the Alps of Switzerland and reached into Italy. Year after year the German emperors led their armies across the Alpine passes and down into the plain of northern Italy. They went there for their coronation at the hands of the Pope, and they frittered away their resources on expeditions which to the myopic eye of the modern historian seem useless and extravagant. The medieval empire included also Austria and as much of Yugoslavia as the emperors were able to control. Such organization as the medieval Empire originally had was based upon the tribal duchies. These were few in number—eight altogether—and large in area. Their basis was not ethnic; each was a mixed group of generally Germanic peoples, and the duke who stood at its head was essentially a war-leader. The extinction of the legitimist Carolingian dynasty in Germany in 911 gave power to the dukes. The next king was chosen from their number, and his lack of hereditary claim to the German crown greatly weakened his standing in relation to his fellow dukes. The dukes themselves were forging a close link between themselves and the people who inhabited their duchies. They made their own offices hereditary; they attracted and retained the loyalty of their “tribe,” and they became the foci of a local or provincial loyalty. Yet Germany did not at this time break up into a number of separate tribal

kingdoms, as at first seemed imminent, and, instead, the authority of the dukes began slowly to be whittled away by the encroachment of the royal power itself. This was the work of the German kings of the Saxony dynasty, begun under Henry the Fowler (919-936) and continued under the three Otto's. The work of the Saxon kings has left its mark on the political map of Germany almost to today. The authority of the dukes was minimized, that of the counts, the subordinate administrators who were often appointed by the kings, was increased; and authority over the church lands, the possessions of bishoprics and monasteries, was separated completely from that of the duchies within which they lay. Subsequently, when cities began to grow to wealth and importance, they too were separated.

This policy was pursued unevenly. Ducal powers remained more significant in Bavaria than they did, for example, in Franconia. Everywhere, however, the power of the church was used to restrict and to weaken that of the dukes and to raise up a swarm of lesser nobility, both lay and spiritual, who rivalled and ultimately replaced the dukes. This was the kind of policy that was pursued by the national monarchies in Western Europe at the end of the middle ages and during the succeeding centuries. A middle class was encouraged to redress a political balance that had tipped too far in favor of the more powerful landed aristocracy. But there were differences. The new class that was elevated by the Saxon kings and their successors was not a middle class. It was made up of landowners, similar to the dukes, but individually smaller and weaker. They did not differ in outlook and ambitions from those whose place they were gradually usurping, and in their own ways they were as jealous of their local power and authority as any of the territorial dukes had been. So far this had been a development in the direction of a unified German state. In contrast with France, where the "great provincial magnates rose to power by subjecting all other lords of their region" and "reduced France to something bordering on anarchy,"⁸ the German kings, in part through their

⁸ Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1947, p. 84.

instrument, the German church, were weakening the opposition of the dukes and reducing the whole nation to some degree of dependence upon themselves.

Why, then, was this trend reversed and Germany reduced to the political anarchy from which France was shortly to be rescued? The answer was not simple. Too many factors, each of them difficult to evaluate, were involved. Foremost among them German historians have generally placed the assumption by Otto I of the dignity of Emperor. He and his successors were each crowned by the Pope and designated as successor to Constantine and Charlemagne. Each derived his actual power from his office of German King, but these obligations and privileges were transcended by those inherent in the imperial crown. In short, the challenge of universal rule weakened the attention which the Emperor could give to Germany and in time the authority which he could command there. It is customary almost to write of the Saxon and Salian emperors as if they had been remiss in not having studied Herder and Fichte and in not having applied themselves as diligently as they might to the unity of Germany. The national concepts and aspirations of the romantics were beyond the comprehension of the medieval emperors. When they frittered away their energies in yearly expeditions to Italy they undoubtedly thought of themselves as acting in the best interests of their German kingdom. And in a material way it cannot be doubted that Germany profitted from their expeditions. Art, literature and trade were all stimulated by the contacts. But the fact is that no German ruler during the middle ages ever devoted himself wholeheartedly and successfully to the building up of a centralized bureaucracy, as for example, Edward I did in England or Kazimierz the Great in Poland.

These side interests of the Emperors might not have been so serious if resistance to the German rulers had not developed within Germany. The kings had used their authority to appoint bishops and abbots as a means of extending their authority and weakening that of the dukes. When, in the second half of the eleventh century, the reform movement in the church brought the autocratic Hildebrand to the Papacy as Gregory VII, the scene was set for a struggle

with the secular arm. The Investiture Contest, as this struggle is called, cannot be discussed here. It is important, in the context of this book, to notice only that it proved to be a turning point in the fortunes of the medieval German monarchy. The Pope showed no scruple in his struggle with the Emperor Henry IV. Henry survived and defended his office, but his successor had to be satisfied with diminished authority. The mass of the German nobility were permanently strengthened. The economic and tenurial system which we know as feudalism took rapid hold of Germany. Castles multiplied as restrictions on the autonomy exerted first by the dukes and later by the emperors were gradually eliminated, and political organization began to center in them. A social and political hierarchy began to emerge. From the undifferentiated mass of counts a few families, the Hohenstaufen, for example, and the Wettin, the Zähringen, the Supplinburg and the Hohenzollern, emerged and increased their authority by gaining the allegiance of their peers. They used each small increment of power to extend their authority, building up in this way groups of possessions beside which the early German dukedoms seemed small and feeble. This was the period when the castles, whose ruins still dot the German landscape, were built. Amid a ground-mass of petty princes, a few built up dominions of great power and influence. Foremost among these were the lands of the church, more especially those of the Archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, Trier, Bremen and Magdeburg, and of the Bishops of Würzburg, Münster, Utrecht and of several other dioceses. These were permanent and their influence was lasting, but the lay principalities came and went with the fortunes of the families that created them. Families that had been important in the early middle ages disappeared and new families like the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern took their places. A further factor in the failure of the Saxon and Salian emperors to achieve a unified state was the parochialism of much of Germany. As significant units in an administrative system, the former dukedoms had ceased to count, but within each there was a clannishness that showed no signs of diminishing. Nor should this seem surprising. To medieval people, as also to many peoples today, the local region, with its modes of speech and fashions

of dress, its ways of building homes and tilling the soil, its emblematic devices slowly being systematized into the science of heraldry, provided the standard. Those who lived beyond the forest or the hill were foreigners, people with different patterns of behavior. It is not surprising that the loyalties which had been focussed on the dukedoms tended to live on long after these offices had disappeared. The Franconian opposed a Saxon Emperor merely because he was a Saxon; a Swabian had little chance of acceptance in the north of Germany. This provincial spirit tended in some measure to be reinforced by new political patterns on the land. The duchy of Bavaria never really disappeared. It continued through the middle ages and into modern times. It survived the creation of the modern German Empire in the nineteenth century and succumbed only to the wave of revolution that swept Germany at the end of the First World War. Even today it is represented, though with somewhat altered boundaries, in the *Land* of Bayern.

In the last chapter we considered briefly the areas of early settlement in Germany, lands where the agricultural increment was naturally high, the population denser and the wealth greater than in other parts of Germany. To some extent these corresponded with the centers of the earlier duchies. The middle Rhineland, around Worms and Speyer, was the core-area of Franconia. Swabia embraced the region of good soils and gentle relief around Lake Constance and the upper Danube. Saxony centered in the loess belt that extended along the northern flank of the Harz Mountains from Magdeburg to Goslar. In large measure the later States of Germany perpetuated this pattern. Though more fragmented and broken up by ecclesiastical and other holdings, the Rhenish Palatinate (Pfalz) spanned the middle Rhineland, the former center of Franconian power, and the County of Württemberg extended it along the fertile Neckar valley. The Hapsburgs came to possess the core of Swabia. The core of ancient Saxony shows on the later political map as the County of Braunschweig (Brunswick) and later still as the Electorate of Hannover.

The perpetuation of political power through the German dukedoms into the later German States in those areas already marked

out by their superior fertility should cause no surprise; power must always have a material base. But what is both interesting and important is the fact that the survival of these political-geographical patterns intensified the regionalism of Germany. A map of German dialects bears a remarkable similarity to that of the ancient duchies, and changes from one predominant village pattern to another and from one style of farmhouse to another are not unrelated to the transition zones from the core area of one "tribal" dukedom to that of its neighbors.

EASTWARD EXPANSION

Through most of the period of the middle ages and into modern times the German Empire was expanding eastward into the Slav lands. This movement of German settlers into less densely settled areas was in large measure a response to a primitive urge for land and freedom. It was also a movement of self-defence designed to protect a threatened frontier from the attacks of peoples living farther to the east, whether Slav, Magyar or Tartar. A series of *Marken*, marches or border states, was established roughly along the Elbe valley, each ruled by a Markgraf whose powers within his domains were proportionate to the tasks with which he was entrusted.

These marches first appeared in the late tenth century, and they continued to be a prominent feature of the political geography of medieval Germany until the end of the middle ages. They formed a belt from the Baltic Sea to the Danube Valley and continued south of the Alps into what is now northern Yugoslavia.

Life was ruder and rougher in the marches than in the lands which they protected. Trade and the crafts were always liable to be interrupted by invasion, and government had a more strongly military character. Marchlands have played a peculiar role in human history. A. J. Toynbee has seen in them the development almost inevitably of an aggressiveness that has led them, as soon as their historic mission was accomplished, to turn and devour that which they had been established to shelter and protect. "Marches," he wrote, "are apt to be stimulated, by the external pressure to which they are exposed, into developing a political power which gives them a predominance

over the interior.”⁹ This generalization, while of doubtful validity, nevertheless does receive some support from the history of the eastern marchlands of Germany. Two of them, Austria and Brandenburg-Prussia, came to dominate Central Europe and to fight one another for control of Germany.

One must guard against too naïve a view of the role of the frontier in German history. There is a widely held opinion that in the German East the spirit of aggression entered into the German soul and gave to it a hard, ruthless, calculating and materialistic quality from which, so it is claimed, many of Europe’s misfortunes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have sprung. Such a view is oversimplified. Attention is, in this chapter, focused on the marches along the Elbe river because their role in the political evolution of Germany was decisive. Let it be noted first that these march states were established at a time when the tribal dukedoms were in decline, when Germany west of the Elbe was fragmenting into a mosaic of petty states presided over by an ineffective emperor. Such division, if ever it had threatened, would have been made improbable in the East by that constant danger which the East existed to oppose. Strong rule was a necessity. A further factor which served to reinforce this contrast between the German East and the West and South lay in the fact that the fragmentation of authority in the West was part of the general trend known as feudalism. The East was occupied too late to share completely in this movement. The eastern marches of Germany can be grouped, largely on a political basis, into (1) a northern group which ultimately fell to Brandenburg-Prussia, (2) a group in Upper Saxony, (3) Bohemia and (4) Austria and the Alpine marches. The most exposed of these, that is the march that came to be called upon to fight most strenuously to protect Germany, was unquestionably the Austrian. It preserved South Germany from Magyars, Tartars and Turks. Next in importance were Bohemia, which in the fourteenth century incorporated Silesia, and Saxony. The least exposed march, and the one that Germany could have best done without, was the March of Brandenburg. Its location was off

⁹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1933, p. 123.

the main line of invasion and movement. The loess belt, along which the Tartars came in 1241, was in fact guarded by Bohemia by virtue of its control over Silesia. The Tartar invasion was checked, not by the Brandenburgers, but by Poles and Silesians at Legnica in lower Silesia. The establishment of the German Knights in East Prussia provided a further screen out in front of Brandenburg. Yet it was the Margraves of Brandenburg, the least exposed to the "stimulus of pressures" of all the marchland states, who gained the predominance over the interior. Before we turn to the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia as a political force in Germany, we must turn to other factors which helped to shape modern Germany: the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War.

THE GERMAN REFORMATION

The German Reformation began in Saxony. Here, at Wittenberg, Martin Luther affixed his theses to the church door and here, in the castle of the Wartburg, he found refuge from his enemies under the protection of Elector Frederick of Saxony. Luther's appeal was to the "German nation"; his apologia at the time of the Diet of Worms was to the "Christian Nobility of the German Nation." He translated the Bible into his own Middle German dialect. Under his leadership a part of Germany rejected the only effective control that remained on the autonomy of the states. The imperial title had passed to the House of Hapsburg and was now vested in Charles V, who included among his titles the kingship of Spain. His interests were only partly in Germany, and there he was interested chiefly in checking the Reformation movement. He failed, and at the Diet of Augsburg in 1555 the principle was adopted whereby the territorial prince, whether ecclesiastical or lay, was to determine the religious affiliation of his state and subjects.

The division of Germany was further increased. The south and the Rhineland, where ecclesiastical estates were numerous, remained Catholic. Part of the North and most of the East, notably Saxony and Brandenburg, became Protestant, and the possessions of the church were sequestrated and added to those of the ruling families. The Scandinavian countries also became Protestant, but in Italy

and the Hapsburg lands the Reformation was ineffective. It was a delicate and dangerous balance that was created at Augsburg, and few regarded it as permanent. Protestant forces were kept on their guard by the movement of the Counter-Reformation, which gained momentum during the second half of the sixteenth century. The gathering crisis came to a head in 1618, when the nobles of Bohemia attempted to replace their catholic king by a protestant. The Thirty Years' War, which followed, started in Bohemia but soon spread to most of Germany as catholic princes and then protestant were drawn in. The war began primarily as a religious struggle with dynastic overtones; it ended with catholic France fighting beside protestant Sweden to overthrow the power of the Hapsburg dynasty in Europe. The Thirty Years' War was far more disastrous than the religious wars of the sixteenth century. Contemporaries with perhaps only a little exaggeration accused the Swedes "of destroying nearly two thousand castles, eighteen thousand villages and over fifteen hundred towns. Bavaria claimed to have lost eighty thousand families and nine hundred villages, Bohemia five-sixths of its villages and three-quarters of its population. In Württemberg the number of the inhabitants was said to have fallen to a sixth, in Nassau to a fifth, in Henneberg to a third, in the wasted Palatinate to a fiftieth of its original size. The population of Colmar was halved, that of Wolfenbüttel had sunk to an eighth, of Magdeburg to a tenth, of Hagenau to a fifth, of Olmütz to less than a fifteenth. Minden, Hameln, Göttingen, Magdeburg, by their own account, stood in ruins."¹⁰ Bismarck claimed that the consequences of the war were visible in the Germany of his own day.

The Thirty Years' War was the last of the great religious wars; if not also the first of the dynastic struggles, it was for Germany one of the most important. It destroyed the hopes of those who had planned to build some unity—perhaps on a federal basis—in Germany. It completed the ruin of the German cities and removed every restriction on the absolutism and the license of the princes. One by one the greater amongst them assumed the style and dignity

¹⁰ Cicely V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War*, Pelican Books, London 1957, pp. 447-448.

of king, maintained ambassadors at foreign courts and in every way conducted themselves as the equal of the emperor himself. Territories on the north of Germany were occupied respectively by the kings of Denmark and Sweden. The King of France took over the Hapsburg possessions in Alsace. Even the formal pretence of the unity of the German Empire was abandoned, and in 1806 the imperial title was at last abandoned. "After 1648 the empire was a meaningless historical survival, Germany a geographical expression: the reality was embedded in the principalities, whose only ambition was to develop into sovereign monarchies."¹¹ Before we discuss the nineteenth century reaction to this anarchic situation, we must see how one state emerged from the mass and attained a dominating position.

BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA

Brandenburg, to which the Hohenzollern family came as margraves in 1411, was far from the most distinguished or important of the eastern tier of march states. On the basis of material resources, one would be tempted to prophesy a more significant role for Brandenburg's neighbor to the south, Electoral Saxony. There was nothing in the resources of Brandenburg and but little in its location that singled it out to be the dominant state. Brandenburg had but one advantage, the clear, coldly calculating mind of its rulers of the house of Hohenzollern. No ruling family in modern times has exploited more shrewdly the divisions between the greater powers, yet the Hohenzollern might have been a great deal less successful if events had not played into their hands.

East Prussia, the domain of the Teutonic Knights, was ruled at the time of the Reformation by Albert of Hohenzollern-Ansbach, as Grand Master of the Order. He became a protestant and secularized the lands of the knights. These were bequeathed by a successor in 1618 to the Elector of Brandenburg. Prussia lay outside Germany and was, legally at least, subject to Polish suzerainty. This was little more than a fiction, and the electors in fact enjoyed the prestige of being rulers and, after 1701, kings of a territory outside

¹¹ Barraclough, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

the German Empire. By a combination of policy and luck, the electors managed to keep the tide of war away from the territories of Brandenburg. While the Palatinate, the foremost protestant state, was devastated over and over again, Brandenburg, and still more Prussia, remained comparatively aloof and secure and emerged from a war which, in fact, it did little to fight, as the leader of the protestant forces of Germany. Inheritance gave Brandenburg some small but potentially rich and strategically well placed possessions in the Rhineland. The peace of 1648 gave Brandenburg the lands of a few sequestrated bishoprics and a foothold on the Baltic coast. Lastly, Brandenburg lay in East Germany, far removed from the influence and authority of France. Her neighbors were Saxony, Poland and Sweden, none of which was in so commanding a position that Brandenburg could not profit from its difficulties. This is exactly what Frederick William, the Great Elector (1640-1688), did, and in this he was followed by King Frederick William I (1713-1740) and by Frederick the Great (1740-1786). The last seized the Hapsburg province of Silesia in 1741 and helped himself generously to Polish territory in the First Partition of 1772, leaving his successors to finish off this tasty morsel in the Second and Third Partitions (1793 and 1796).

Yet the power of Prussia was shortlived. Frederick the Great's successors did not have his capacity. In 1806 Prussia was invaded by Napoleon, and at Jena the Prussian army, neglected since the days of Frederick, was completely destroyed. Napoleon proceeded to occupy Berlin and to overthrow the monuments to Prussia's former military strength. Yet it was in this darkest period in Prussia's history that her nineteenth century triumph in Germany originated. The year of Napoleon's occupation of Berlin saw two events in the city, both of them of almost symbolic importance, both almost unnoticed by the occupying forces. The first was the appointment of Freiherr vom Stein as Minister of the Interior; the other was the lectures of J. G. Fichte which have become known to us as the "Addresses to the German Nation."

"It has been frequently pointed out," wrote J. A. R. Marriott, "that Prussia has owed nothing to the beneficence of nature. . . . She

owes her pride of place to a remarkable succession of great rulers, a line of kings who have pursued undeviatingly and with single-minded devotion a carefully thought-out policy, designed to build up, out of the most unpromising materials, a great political edifice in Central Europe.”¹² Stein and his associates, particularly Hardenberg, the elder von Humboldt and the military reformers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, carried on the traditions established by the more recent Hohenzollerns. They carried through in Prussia a social revolution as profound as the French Revolution in France, but without the outward manifestations, the waste and the suffering that revolutions usually occasion. The serfs were emancipated, and legal distinctions of class abolished; the tax structure was reformed, the bureaucracy overhauled and industry promoted.

Prussia's revival was rapid. A Prussian contingent again fought against the French at Leipzig, the “Battle of the Nations,” where Napoleon was defeated and driven back to France. The Prussian army of Blücher was two years later to come upon the field of Waterloo and to clinch Wellington's final victory over Napoleon.

In the peace negotiations which had been begun before and were completed after the Waterloo campaign, territorial compensation to Prussia was a primary consideration. Napoleon had recreated the Polish state, under the name of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, mainly from territory which Prussia had gained at the Partitions. In the Treaty of Kalisz of 1813, this new Polish state was again Partitioned, the Russian Tsar taking the more easterly half at the price of allowing and helping Prussia to expand her limits in the West. But where was Prussia to obtain compensation and satisfaction for her ambitions? She gained it in two areas, Saxony and the Rhineland. The Kingdom of Saxony was penalized for an overzealous loyalty to Napoleon by the loss of the northern half of its territory, including the future industrial centers of Halle and Merseburg, which was incorporated into Prussia. Secondly the small, scattered, Rhenish possessions of Prussia, which had been taken over by Napoleon, were restored, suitably enlarged and enriched. Prussia thus

¹² John A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson, *The Evolution of Prussia*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1946. n. 164.

got possession of the cities of Cologne, Aachen and Trier and of the Ruhr coalfield, whose importance was already becoming apparent. Prussia emerged from the Napoleonic Wars, despite her vacillation and the incompetence of her kings, by far the most extensive of the German states, the poverty of her traditional lands in the East offset by the richness of Saxony and the Rhineland, and her administrative structure more purposeful and more efficient than that of any other German state.

THE GERMAN NATION

The other seminal fact of the years 1807-8 was the series of lectures given by Fichte in Berlin. They were addressed, not to Brandenburg-ers or Prussians, but to the "German Nation." Fichte distinguished in a way which any political geographer would approve between the state, or states, legal-political units subject in their boundaries and fortunes to the balance of political power, and the nation. The former was ephemeral; the latter, permanent. The former contingent on the political situation; the latter, a product of the German soul. In this Fichte was not breaking entirely new ground. The humanists of the early sixteenth century had conceived of a German people transcending the political divisions of contemporary Germany. This incipient sense of nationhood was lost in the division of Germany wrought by the Reformation. What evidence there was of national feeling was expressed very largely on the protestant side. Opposition to Rome was construed as resistance to an outside power that tried to control the German nation. But the unity of Germany was fatally broken, and a reawakening of nationalism had to await a saner and more secular age. The immediate precursor of Fichte was J. G. Herder, more an antiquarian than a philosopher, who was interested in the study of German language and folkways. Fichte, in his "Addresses to the German Nation," regarded language as the hallmark of the nation, and "the nation as the embodiment of the Eternal; to which the high-minded man devotes himself with joy, and the low-minded man . . . must be made to devote himself." Language forms the national character, and the nation is co-extensive with the language group. The state should be the political expression of the

nation; it becomes the duty of the state to preserve the identity of the nation and, because the nation is "the embodiment of the Eternal," nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the state's fulfillment of its divine mission. This argument Fichte supported and enshrouded with a cloud of metaphysical nonsense. But to his own age, Fichte's message was clear. The German nation cries out for the creation of a German state embracing the whole of the German nation. He predicted the smooth working of the German state on two further assumptions. One was that the state should be autocratic and authoritarian, the ends of the state transcending those of the totality of its citizens; the former is eternal and divine, the latter ephemeral. This philosophical essentialism itself derives from Plato, and in its political application was continued from Fichte through Hegel and Nietzsche to Rosenberg and Hitler. The second assumption which Fichte made was more at variance with the climate of opinion of his times. The state should be economically self-sufficient. Free trade he regarded as a relic of medieval internationalism. For the German state to become dependent on another state for any essential materials would be a dereliction of its sacred duty to insure at all costs the well-being of its nation. Economic self-sufficiency did not fit in with the ideas of Friedrich List and the free traders of the nineteenth century, and it was left for this aspect of Fichte's political thought to be revived by the National Socialists in the twentieth.

But enough remained of Fichte's political philosophy to provide a haven to German nationalism during the nineteenth century. That nationalism was essentially authoritarian and anti-liberal, but at the Vienna settlement of 1815 reaction triumphed, and the dynasties whose positions had been threatened by the French Revolution and Napoleon were ensconced again in their former seats, to enjoy a short St. Martin's summer of power and authority. Nationalism had to join forces with liberalism, and the conflict inherent between them was smoothed over, at least for the time.

German liberalism during the nineteenth century, then, took the shape of a demand for an all-German parliament and an all-German government responsible to the German people. Student societies—*Burschenschaften*—spread the national ideas. They celebrated the

three hundredth anniversary of the Reformation with an outburst of patriotic fervor at, appropriately enough, the Wartburg, in the protection of which Luther had found refuge. Reactionary politicians were shot at by liberal-minded students, and what remained of the German princes, with but few exceptions, formed a closed society dedicated to resisting the liberals and preserving their privileges. Germany survived the revolutions of 1830 almost unscathed. Not so, however, the year of revolutions, the "Springtime of Nations," as it was called, 1848. Liberal opinion was already well organized. The revolution in Germany was precipitated by the collapse of the rule of Louis-Philippe in Paris and of Metternich in Vienna. In Berlin and Prague the liberals took over the city. At Frankfurt an all-German diet met with high hopes of creating in Germany a united state with liberal, parliamentary institutions. The hopes of the liberals were doomed to failure, not only because of the opposition of the German princes, led by the Prussian King, to any abdication of their power, but also because of the contradictions within the program of German liberal-nationalism. Nationalism, by its nature, could not be liberal; nor could true liberalism be national.

The outcome of the Frankfurt Parliament was indeed a tragedy for Germany. It marked a turning point in its political evolution. Fichte had envisaged his own state of Prussia as assimilated within a united Germany. That this could not happen became apparent at Frankfurt. The tragic alternative was to create German unity around the nucleus provided by Prussia. That was to be the achievement of Bismarck.

THE GERMAN POLITICAL MAP

The limits of the medieval Empire were never, as we have seen, defined with precision, because there was always some degree of confusion between the universal claims of the Holy Roman Empire and the restricted claims of the German Empire. The boundary of the latter in the west gradually gained precision during the middle ages and sixteenth century. Here it came to correspond with the line of the four rivers: Scheldt, Meuse, Saône and Rhône. On the north it followed the sea and the Eider River, which almost cuts the Danish

peninsula off from the rest of the continent. In the south it included the Alpine provinces of Savoy, Switzerland and Austria and extended rather indeterminately into Italy. The eastern boundary was subject to the greatest change, as the march states pressed eastward into Slav lands. The lands between the Elbe and Oder were absorbed into Germany; Pomerania was occupied, and Silesia and Moravia, in virtue of incorporation into the Kingdom of Bohemia, were regarded as part of the Empire. To the south, the Archduchy of Austria and the duchies of Styria and Krain formed the border provinces in this direction. In the closing decades of the middle ages, the German Empire made no fresh advances and in one quarter actually retreated. The knights of the Teutonic Order had, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, occupied much of the area known subsequently as East Prussia. Then, with the occupation of West Prussia and the city of Danzig, the knights linked their territory with Pomerania. In 1410, however, the Teutonic Knights suffered defeat at the hands of the Poles in the battle of Grunwald, or Tannenberg. The Poles recovered West Prussia, and East Prussia itself came to be held by the Knights as vassals of the Polish crown. Prussia thus lay entirely outside the limits of medieval Germany, and the strong states of Poland and Hungary had set limits to further expansion.

Henceforward, one must distinguish between the legal pretensions of the Empire and its *de facto* extent. Switzerland, though varying in extent, had enjoyed a virtual independence of the German Empire for centuries, though this was not recognized legally until 1648. The kings of France got possession of territories between the earlier boundary and the Rhine. These were at least nominally held of the Empire, though they were gradually integrated into France. The Spanish Netherlands—later the state of Belgium—remained a member of the Empire, while the Dutch or United Netherlands acquired in 1609 a *de facto* independence which was acknowledged by the powers in 1648. The Italian provinces one by one dropped off to form petty states in their own right.

Until the beginning of the eighteenth century the territorial record of the German Empire was one of slow retreat, as it abandoned

its pretensions and pulled in its boundaries. This was, however, offset in the eighteenth century by a renewed political expansion in the east. Austria, having held the Turkish onslaught in 1683, advanced her boundaries in the wake of the retreating Turk until all Hungary, with Slovakia, Transylvania and Croatia, passed under Hapsburg rule. More than half the domains of the Hapsburgs came to lie outside the boundaries of the Empire. The same happened in the north-east. Prussia, a fief of the Polish crown, passed to the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg. In 1656 Polish suzerainty was renounced, and between 1772 and 1796 much of western Poland was taken by Prussia in the Partitions of Poland. Thus it happened that the two most important of the German states derived a large, perhaps a major part of their political power from areas lying outside the bounds of the Empire.

This discussion of the changing extent of both the Empire and the possessions of its member-states is important because, in a certain way, it marks out a German sphere of influence in Central Europe. Herein lies the basis of later German claims.

The ending of the imperial title in 1806, the reshaping of the European map by Napoleon and the rewards and punishments handed out at the Vienna Conference which ended the Napoleonic Wars, drastically changed the political picture within Germany. Particularism among the multitude of German states had been gaining pace in the eighteenth century. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 set its seal upon this state of affairs. The smaller, less viable states, dozens and scores of them, were merged with others. Some fifty survived. Each had to be strong enough to be viable, to resist both revolution within and intrigue from without. Both Austria and Prussia wanted to preserve a divided Germany, but it had to be a Germany that would be stable in its diversity. Germany became a Confederation, with a central organization made up of representatives not of peoples, but of princes. The units of which it was made up were now wholly arbitrary. The particularism which had characterized all German history culminated in 1815. The name of Germany disappeared from the political map and was replaced by Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg and the rest. Some of these states were new; all had

changed their boundaries; none had succeeded in identifying the state with the land and the people in a way that would give them an enduring quality. They remained arbitrary until the end, superimposed on the people by the contingencies of political events, and none of them attracted more than a small measure of loyalty and devotion. The Kingdoms of Saxony and Bavaria survived, the former so truncated that it had lost much of its earlier character, the latter enlarged by the addition of most of Franconia. The lower Rhineland, with Cologne and the growing cities of the Ruhr, was arbitrarily added to Prussia, and its citizens called themselves *Mus-spreussen*. Much of north-west Germany became an enlarged Kingdom of Hannover, which until 1837 shared with Great Britain the person of a wholly inadequate monarch.

BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE

It was Bismarck who cut through this problem. A Prussian Junker by birth, a diplomat by profession, he combined the authoritarian instincts of the Prussian nobility with a political awareness that was unusual in this social class. The King of Prussia had refused to allow himself to be drawn into a united Germany organized on liberal principles by the intellectuals gathered at Frankfurt. Union on *their* terms was impossible; the alternative was union on Prussia's terms. The conditions of such union were clear; they amounted to no less than the elimination from Germany proper of the influence of both France and the Hapsburg emperors of Austria, both of which would have regarded itself as threatened by the triumph of Prussia. Bismarck eliminated these influences by means of three wars. They were short wars, and because they were planned and thus inevitable, their pretext is irrelevant. The first was a short skirmish with Denmark in 1864. Its pretext was a dynastic dispute, the succession to the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, but the quarrel was really a broader one than that. It was a question of whether the duchies were parts of Germany or of Denmark, and in invading and retaining them for Germany, Bismarck received the sympathy and support of most Germans. Having demonstrated that he was a good nationalist, Bismarck then turned upon Austria, created a *casus belli* out of the

confused Danish situation and, in seven weeks in 1866, defeated Austria and imposed a treaty of peace. A condition of the treaty was the dissolution of the now moribund German Confederation and its replacement by another organization in which Austria would not participate. Thus was Austria, and with it, of course, Bohemia and Moravia, excluded from Germany, of which they had formed a part since the early middle ages. There could be no doubt now of the supremacy of Brandenburg-Prussia in the new Germany. Prussia annexed the states of Hannover, Hesse-Kassel and Nassau, and all of Germany lying north of approximately the River Main was merged into a North German Confederation, in which nine-tenths of the area and even more of the political influence belonged to Prussia. The King of Prussia became the hereditary president of the new Confederation, and Bismarck its chancellor.

The Confederation was, as it was doubtless intended to be, merely a blueprint of the united Germany, which Bismarck created four years later. The expulsion of Austria had allowed Prussia to build a North German state around itself. The completion of the unity of Germany required the defeat and humiliation of France, and to this end the war of 1870 was contrived by Bismarck. But France undoubtedly played into his hands. After the Prussian victory in 1866 the French ambassador foolishly asked for "compensation" for France in the shape of the cession to France of Mainz and the Bavarian Palatinate. Bismarck saw to it that the press received this information, and its publication in the South German states led to a wave of sympathy for Prussia. Thus, in the war into which Bismarck inveigled the French Emperor, he again had the support of Germans. The war was short and victorious. The French Emperor, Napoleon III, surrendered. The fortress of Metz capitulated, and the Germans entered Paris in triumph. The Treaty of Frankfurt (1871), which ended the Franco-Prussian War, robbed France of the province of Alsace, with the exception of the fortress-city of Belfort, and of the eastern part of Lorraine. Bismarck's motives in annexing this territory have been variously interpreted. It has frequently been said that his objective was to include within the new Germany the iron ore deposits of Lorraine. If this was the case, he was singularly ill-

informed by his geologists, for he left the better part of the ore in France. Everything points to the German-speaking population of Alsace and part of Lorraine as the dominant motive for their annexation, and to the strategic escarpment, discussed in the previous chapter, as the chief influence on the actual line of the boundary.

Even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Frankfurt, the unity of the German Empire was completed. King William of Prussia came to Paris as the President of the North German Confederation. There, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, he was proclaimed German Emperor. The North German Confederation was extended to include the South German states, and its constitution amended accordingly. Yet even at this last moment there were difficulties.

The Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg objected to having their lands simply merged into Germany. Nor were they merely jealous of their own royal pretensions; their particularism reflected the feelings of their subjects. These were suspicious of the North Germans, of the Prussians in particular, and resentful of the way in which these latter had spread their tentacles through the whole German Reich. So Bavaria and Württemberg came into the German Empire conditionally. Their kings retained their titles, commanded their own armies, had special seats on the committees of the *Bundesrat*, or Federal German Council, controlled their own post, telegrams and railroads, and within narrow limits had their own civil law and taxation. Stamp-collectors will remember that until 1920 Bavaria and Württemberg issued their own postage stamps. The title of the Emperor himself raised a difficult problem. The South German kings objected to the title "Emperor of Germany" for one whom they regarded as merely the leader among equals. Eventually the title *Kaiser in Deutschland*, or "German Emperor" was chosen as less offensive to other German rulers. These precautions were not merely the legal quibbles of a group of jealous petty sovereigns. The state of Bavaria derived directly from the "tribal" duchy of Bavaria. Its boundaries had changed somewhat since the tenth century, but its unbroken continuity was evidence of a cohesion and depth of local feeling that would have made its absorption into a unitary German state almost impossible.

States-rights in Germany were protected by the institution of the *Bundesrat*, made up of delegates of those states that had survived. It was of course heavily weighted in favor of Prussia, but the others, especially Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse, Baden and Saxony, could together outvote Prussia and thus guarantee their rights. The position of Alsace-Lorraine in the new German Empire was anomalous. It was attached, not to one of the German states, but to Germany as a whole. It was the *Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen*; its officials were appointed by the *Bundesrat* but, in fact, the majority were Prussian. Alsace-Lorraine was almost treated as if it were a colonial dependency, and its population, never too well disposed toward the German Empire, was gradually antagonized.

Such was, geographically considered, the German Empire that went to war in August 1914 against Russia and France. It was far from being a unitary state. The particularism implicit in its constitution was reinforced by the powerful forces of geography and history. Railroads, industry, trade and the German bureaucracy were slowly eroding the particularism of the German states. New core-areas, notably the Ruhr industrial region, were bringing about a new mobility of labor. But particularism, especially the particularism that centered in the ancient centers of urban growth and political consciousness, the middle Rhineland, the Neckar valley, Bavaria, Saxony and Thuringia, remained. The cohesiveness of Germany was not sufficient to withstand the stresses of military defeat in 1918.

The Unity of the German Realm

THE political divisions that had characterized Germany before the creation of the Empire in 1871 extended also to its economic development. The economy had become fragmented into a number of more or less self-contained and self-sufficing units, around each of which a wall of tariffs had been built that restricted trade and hindered the rise of industry. The United Kingdom had become the factory of the world while Germany remained predominantly agricultural. When the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, and the number of German states was reduced by extinction and absorption to some fifty, Germany was a rural country. Almost three-quarters of its population lived in villages and worked on the land. Its cities were numerous, but very small. Germany "started the century with an urban life that was in many ways medieval, and in many places less vigorous than it had been in the days of Dürer and Hans Sachs."¹³ The pattern of rural peasants and urban craftsmen had been stereotyped by law in much of Germany. The state might itself develop certain branches of industry which it regarded as necessary, but there was little scope for the kind of entrepreneur who was, by the aggressive pursuit of his own personal ends, changing the face of the United Kingdom. Status among the rural population, the organization of the guilds among the urban, held German society in a grip that was relaxed only by French Revolutionary ideas at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The light of new ideas shone most brightly in the Rhineland. A veneer of economic freedom was stretched over the Rhineland by the French; church lands were secularized, and after their restoration in 1815 the ter-

¹³ John H. Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany*, 4th. edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1936, p. 82.

ritorial princes were not able—much as they tried—to reverse the changes that had been made.

In the German East, in Prussia, change was more carefully planned and controlled. The serfs were freed, the possession of property ceased to depend on status, the bureaucratic machine was tidied up and, under the sponsorship of the government, a beginning was made with the development of a modern industry. But progress was uneven everywhere and was faster in Prussia than in, let us say, Württemberg. Paradoxically, the most vigorous industrial development was not in those parts of Germany which lay closest to France and Great Britain, but in the far east, where the land was organized in large feudal estates and the peasants still subject to the arbitrary will of their lords. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the iron works of Upper Silesia, owned by the Hohenlohes, the Henckels and the Prince of Pless, were among the most progressive in continental Europe. The paradox is easy to resolve. Only in the most reactionary and feudally organized areas was there a sufficient degree of freedom from the restraint of guilds and similar vested interests for such progress to be possible.

Yet, when at last Germany did begin to feel the stimulus toward economic growth, it was like the rise of modern nationalism. Man-made barriers and constraints had held it back for so long that, when at last the mounting pressures swept them aside, both nationalism and industrialization rushed forward at an almost catastrophic pace. We saw in the previous chapter that German nationalism is young, sensitive, arrogant and brash. Economic growth also has certain of these qualities. German business, like the German state, grew up efficient, ruthless and aggressive. In this chapter, however, we are concerned only with certain aspects of German economic growth. Our primary concern being the unity and division of Germany, it is necessary to emphasize the role of economic growth in the creation of the functional unity of modern Germany.

THE TARIFF UNION

A few years before he delivered his "Addresses to the German Nation," J. G. Fichte had published a book with the curious title

of the "Closed Commercial State." Here he presented his arguments for an economic nationalism, as he was later to present those for a political nationalism. International trade, the dependence of one state on the products of another and the scramble for the possession and control of scarce commodities are, he argued, the breeding ground of war. The state should avoid this kind of dependence; it should be self-sufficing and, in effect, it should have no trade. He admitted, however, that the petty German states of his day were too small in area and too limited in resource for this freedom from dependence on others to be practicable. But these little statelets he never regarded as sacrosanct, and he looked for the creation of a greater Germany of which they would all be parts. The boundaries of this greater Germany would be set by, first, the limits of the German nation, and, second, the extent of the territory necessary for Germany to practice the self-sufficiency which Fichte advocated. The inconsistency between these two basic criteria was never resolved either by Fichte himself or by any of those whose political philosophy was in any way derived from him.

Fichte's thought is important in two respects. In the first place, it provided an argument in favor of the economic unification of Germany, for in this way only could a large and varied enough area be established for his policy of economic nationalism to be practicable. Secondly, his argument that the state is justified in extending its boundaries until it becomes viable as an economically closed unit was to receive a practical application at the hands of Hitler and was used to support his policy of aggression more than a century later.

Our concern here is with the former application of Fichte's political philosophy, the creation of a free trade area coextensive with Germany itself. Each of the fifty odd German states had its own tariff system. The tariff rates themselves were sometimes high and frequently arbitrary. They did not prevent trade, but they would have prevented a manufacturer from achieving the economies of a nation-wide market. The removal, or at least the standardization, of tariffs was a necessary prelude to the establishment of an all-German market for German products. The first step, an unconscious

one, as it proved, was taken by Prussia in 1818. In that year Prussia revised her own tariff system and came up with "immeasurably the wisest and most scientific tariff then existing among the great powers." The Prussian tariff system was not at the start conceived of as a basis for a German tariff. But the geographical, and hence the commercial, position of Prussia was peculiar. Prussia was a relatively large but discontinuous area. Its boundaries were inordinately long in proportion to its area, and smuggling was easy; its territory included numerous enclaves tucked away within the limits of other states. Its customs system had been inherited from the different political units which it had absorbed. Any system that made order out of the Prussian system was capable of extension to other German states.

That the extension of this system to the rest of Germany became desirable was the result of another aspect of the Prussian system. Prussia constituted at this time two separate blocks of territory with a number of outliers. One covered Westphalia and the lower Rhineland; the other, East Germany. Near Kassel they approached to within 25 miles of each other, but this corridor, occupied by the states of Hannover and Hesse, was too narrow to provide for most of the German states a route by which they might circumvent Prussian territory. Whatever route trade and travellers might take, they had at some point or other to cross some part of Prussia. The new Prussian tariffs benefitted from this by imposing a stiff transit duty on all merchandise. This benefitted the Prussian exchequer without, it was supposed, injuring Prussian business, and it had the great asset of damaging Prussia's rivals in the German states system.

The weaker or more disadvantageously situated states made agreements with Prussia. The stronger, such as Bavaria and Württemberg, made agreements among themselves in an attempt to evade the consequences of this new form of Prussian imperialism. But by 1833 even the latter felt obliged to come to terms with Prussia. The German Zollverein, or Customs Union, was formed, and goods began to pass without customs examination or duty between its members. But the northern tier of states, with the direct encourage-

ment of England, held out. They were, first and foremost, the Kingdom of Hannover; then the duchies of Oldenburg, Holstein and Mecklenburg and the Free Cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck. They not only had access to the sea themselves, but they cut Prussia off from the sea. They were the only states in Germany that ever had a chance of treating Prussia as Prussia had treated the rest. Nevertheless, Hannover came into the Zollverein in 1851 and Oldenburg in 1852. Only Hamburg and Bremen remained independent of the customs union, until in 1888 they too joined, and the legal framework for an economic union of Germany was at last a reality.

Even before the process of breaking down tariff barriers within Germany had been completed, a movement was gaining pace for raising them yet higher around Germany as a whole. Friedrich List, who had inherited the mantle of J. G. Fichte, called, in his "National System of Political Economy," for a large German free-trade area, extended where necessary in the interests of the German economy and enclosed by a tariff wall high enough to give protection to German industry. In the early years of the German Empire there was a short period when the commercial policy of Germany was characterized by a relatively free pattern of trade. Then the demands of the industrialists for protection for their infant industries; of the owners of the great estates for the elimination of the competition of foreign grain; of the treasury for a greater income; of the extreme nationalists, true to the traditions of Fichte and List, for a higher degree of national self-sufficiency, all combined to raise gradually the level of taxation on *all* imports.

The German tariff system was the most systematic and carefully considered in Europe. Those who designed it had never visualized self-sufficiency as a goal; it would have been in any event an unattainable one. But they did create a greater degree of interdependence between the regions that made up Germany than had ever existed before. Imported grain increased in importance during the last quarter of the century, but, thanks to the tariff, the industrialized and populous Rhineland consumed more bread crops from the German East than from the New World. Conversely, the tariffs

restricted the competition of British coal with German in the northern ports of Bremen and Hamburg, and of British and Belgian metal goods with the products of the workshops that lay thick along the little rivers of the Siegerland. The forging of a pattern of economic interdependence among all parts of Germany had not been among the advertised objectives of the German tariff system, but it was one of the results of its implementation. From the extreme of economic fragmentation Germany was swung by the policy of Bismarck and of his successors almost to the opposite extreme of regional interdependence.

POPULATION

With the exception of the Russians, the Germans are the most numerous of the nations of Europe. At the beginning of the nineteenth century they were no more than two-thirds the population of France; they about equalled the number of Italians and but narrowly exceeded that of the British. The military and political preponderance of France at the beginning of the century must be viewed against the background of France's demographic superiority. In 1820 the population of the German Confederation was about 22,850,000; that of France was about 31,000,000, and of Great Britain, about 15,400,000. During the first half of the nineteenth century the increase of population in Germany was unusually rapid. By mid-century the German total had risen to 35,128,000, and at the time of the foundation of the Empire it had risen to about 41,000,000.

At the beginning of the century this population had been largely rural, and in 1850 well over 70 per cent still lived in the villages. German cities were mostly small. Many retained the city walls which had been defended against the Swedes or the Imperialists during the 'Thirty Years' War, and comparatively few had outgrown their medieval frame. Cologne in 1800 was a city of merely 50,000 people, and by 1850 it had still not reached 100,000 inhabitants. Essen was little more than a walled village when the century began, and by 1850 it had scarcely attained the rank of a small town. At the mid-century Düsseldorf had reached a population of only 27,000, and Munich, the largest German city at this time after Berlin

and the northern sea ports, had only just exceeded one hundred thousand inhabitants.

After 1850 this changed rapidly. The freedom of movement and trade generated by the Zollverein, the weakening of the highly structured society, the slow impact of the new technology and the government's solicitude for technical and scientific education all contributed to a period of intense economic growth that is without parallel in Europe and is equalled only by that of modern Japan and of the Soviet Union.

In the 1860's the population of Germany first exceeded that of France. There is a rough symbolism in the fact that Prussia defeated France and created the German Empire at the very time when Germany's superiority in manpower first became apparent. From 37,611,000 in 1860, the total German population rose to 40,805,000 in 1870; 45,095,000 in 1880, 56,046,000 in 1900 and 67,790,000 at the outbreak of the First World War. This increase in total population was accompanied by a rush to the cities. Some grew at a phenomenally rapid rate during the second half of the century. From 9,000 in 1850, Essen rose to 118,862 in 1900 and to 439,000 in 1920. The growth of Düsseldorf was only a degree less rapid: from 27,000 in 1850 to 407,000 in 1920. Even more spectacular was the expansion of some villages that had never even had the status of cities before the later years of the nineteenth century: Oberhausen, Herne and Gelsenkirchen in the Ruhr area; Kattowitz and Königshütte in Upper Silesia.

The new-found mobility of the German population brought Polish-speaking peasants from Pomerania and East Prussia to the Ruhr, from the poor soils of Brandenburg into Berlin and from the hills of Central Germany into the expanding industrial cities along their northern margin. The mobility of labor, like the exchange of agricultural and industrial commodities, was bringing opposite parts of Germany closer to one another.

The losses of territory by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 reduced the population of Germany from its 1918 level of 66,811,000 to 61,797,000 in 1920. But the natural growth of population restored it by 1934 to its 1918 level, and the re-incorporation of the Saar Ter-

ritory in 1935 and the annexations which followed took the population of Greater Germany, at the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, to about 79,600,000.

RAILWAYS AND THE GERMAN TRANSPORTATION NET

Internal trade and the mobility of the German population would have been impossible without the development of a network of railroads. As a co-ordinated system, the German railroads anticipated those of France. They completed, it has been said, the work which the Zollverein had commenced, that of creating a functional whole out of a congeries of little states. The first line was opened in 1835 in Bavaria, the short line from Nürnberg to Fürth. The German apostle of railroad building was that same Friedrich List who had advocated economic union, high tariffs and self-sufficiency. In any event, the latter objectives could not be realized, if indeed they could be realized at all, without a railroad net. In 1840 a line was opened from Magdeburg to Leipzig. Its success overcame the suspicions of the conservative and the hostility of those interested in other projects. The Prussian government played an active role, and by 1860 had itself promoted the construction of 3500 miles of track. The more important states followed the example of Prussia, building lines that were linked with the Prussian system and financed generally by their governments. By the mid-nineteenth century it was possible to travel by rail between the more important centers of population and industry. Only the British system provided a transportation net that was more complete and better suited to the needs of industry. At the time of the creation of the German Empire, the railroad net was in all essentials completed.

This early development of a reasonably complete railroad system was a factor of immense importance in the rise of German industry. In Great Britain, and to some extent also in France and Belgium, the rise of modern industry had preceded the creation of a railroad system. In these countries the location of industry tended to be oriented strongly toward the source of materials and of power, and as coal came to constitute the chief source of power,

industries were highly concentrated on the coalfields. This is not to deny that in Germany also the coalfields exercised a powerful attraction and that the Ruhr coalfield came to support the most important industrial concentration in the country. But on the whole there was a greater degree of dispersion. Although there developed important concentrations of the textile industries, nowhere in Germany were these concentrated quite so much as they were in Lancashire and Yorkshire in Great Britain, and some parts of France. In the simplest terms, in Great Britain the Industrial Revolution, preceding the railway age, drew the industries to the coalfields; in Germany steam-powered industry, coming in the main later than the building of the railways, was able to stay where its water-powered predecessor had always been, merely replacing the local sources of water-power with coal freighted in by rail. Thus the little textile centers in the mountains of Silesia, in the hills of upper Saxony and in the deep, narrow valleys of the Rhineland Highlands continued to flourish. Other centers grew up, especially on the northern plain to the west of the river Rhine. But all had this in common: they did not feel strongly the attractive force of a coalfield location.

The improvement of transportation by water had preceded the building of railroads. Rivers had long been important in German commerce, but during the eighteenth century the number of toll stations, which seemed to increase with that of the petty sovereignties through which the rivers flowed, had greatly reduced their importance. On the Rhine there were at the end of the eighteenth century about thirty separate toll stations. On the Elbe there were no fewer than fourteen between Magdeburg and Hamburg, and other rivers were similarly burdened. The conquest of Germany by the armies of Napoleon put an end to most of these tolls. After the Napoleonic Wars the number of German states was drastically reduced. The disappearance of many of the smaller states removed some of the more oppressive restrictions on trade. However, it was not until the Zollverein had become a reality that the conditions at last existed for the development of the German rivers as highways of commerce.

While legal and fiscal obstacles to the commercial use of rivers were gradually being removed, the physical conditions of navigation were slowly being improved. On the Rhine the swiftly changing meanders upstream from Mainz, which had been a serious barrier to the use of the river, were straightened and regulated by the Baden engineer, Tulla. In the gorge tract of the Rhine rocks were blasted away to deepen and straighten the river; its tributaries were improved for barges, and similar work was done on the Weser, Elbe and Oder. The first steamboat to make its appearance on a German river was launched on the Rhine in 1816. The number of steamers and the size of barges increased rapidly during the early railway age. Further expansion of internal navigation was slowed during the peak period of railroad construction. Then, in the later years of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth, the cutting of canals extended the network of German waterways.

The earliest canal to be cut in Germany for the handling of bulk cargoes was in Upper Silesia, a small canal that linked the coal mines with the navigable Oder. It was too early, and in consequence too small, to have played an important role in the commercial integration of Germany. Similarly the canal cut by King Ludwig of Bavaria to join the Main with the Danube is too small for modern needs, and it is little used. But apart from these early essays in canal-building, the German canal projects were planned on ambitious lines and remain today well suited to the needs of commerce. The largest of them, the Kiel Canal, was however primarily strategic. It was opened in 1914 across the base of the Danish peninsula in order to allow German warships operating in the North Sea to profit from the relative security of the German Baltic Sea ports. It soon came to be used by German merchant vessels, and it added considerably to the commerce of Lübeck. The Dortmund-Ems Canal, opened in 1898, was entirely commercial; its purpose was to facilitate the movement of bulk cargoes between the Ruhr coalfield and the German North Sea port of Emden. Feeder canals were constructed through the Ruhr industrial area and were connected with the Rhine at Ruhrort. More ambitious was the Mittelland Canal. A

waterway cut mainly along the marshy valleys of late glacial rivers, it ran from its connection with the Dortmund-Ems Canal in the west to the Elbe in the east, and from there through the greater Berlin region to the Oder.

It is difficult to form a precise estimate of the relative importance of rivers and canals in German internal commerce. They probably carried during the later years of the nineteenth century and up to the First World War about a fifth of the total internal commerce. Almost all of this was bulk goods, such as coal, coke, iron ore, lumber and building materials. Berlin was supplied by coal from both the Ruhr and the Upper Silesian coalfields, all of it brought to the city by barge. These domestic sources of supply ran into a limited competition in the city from English coal that had been brought up the Elbe from the port of Hamburg.

Between the First and Second World Wars an even greater importance attached to inland waterways. The old Upper Silesian coal canal was replaced by a large canal able to handle the modern coal barges. Improvements were made in the Oder, Elbe, Saale, Main, Neckar and other rivers, and the Mittelland Canal was extended by the construction of a bridge across the river Elbe to join the network of waterways in the Berlin region.

The construction of a network of all-weather roads came late in Germany. Under the influence of France, good roads had been built in the Rhineland at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but in the German East roads remained few in number and execrable in quality until late in the century. The damp clay plains of North Germany lent themselves more to the cutting of canals than to the building of roads, and until the time of the establishment of the German Empire in 1871 there was no coordinated policy of road building and, in the case of the smaller states, no money for such a program. It was not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the situation began to improve, and not until the coming of the automobile was much attention paid to the quality of the road surfaces.

The picture that emerges from this discussion of Germany's transportation and trade is one of static and almost medieval conditions

until approximately the middle of the nineteenth century. Life, economic as well as political, was compartmentalized by the existing political divisions, within each of which conditions were almost self-contained and self-sufficing. Yet these conditions were reversed during the second half of the century, as the political unity was achieved and the consequences of the Zollverein made themselves apparent. One consequence of this lateness in introducing modern industry has already been indicated. It was able to make use of developed means of transportation, and thus to disperse itself over the whole country. Although some parts of Germany inevitably became more important industrially than others, a mutual dependence of the many parts was in fact achieved. Germany almost overnight established a functional—Germans would have called it an organic—unity. This unity was scarcely challenged by the peace settlement which followed the First World War, but it succumbed to the invasions and occupation at the end of the Second. It is this unity, this interdependence of parts, which many Germans aim to restore.

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF GERMANY

In no country, with the exception of the communist nations, has industrialization been achieved so quickly as in Germany. When the German Empire was established in 1871, approximately two-thirds of its population was still rural and one third urban. When the First World War began, this situation had approximately been reversed.

Industrial growth during the nineteenth century was based upon coal resources and transportation facilities. Nature had laid up the former in abundant measure, and man was in process of creating the latter. Germany, within her nineteenth century boundaries, possessed about 80 per cent of Europe's bituminous coal resources excluding the Russian. These ranged in quality from gas coal to anthracite, and they included a generous proportion of coking coal in the Ruhr coalfield, supplemented by a near monopoly of Europe's brown coal resources. Even before the creation of the German Empire, German coal production already exceeded the combined pro-

duction of France and Belgium. The following forty years was a period of unusually rapid expansion of the coal mining industry. Bituminous coal production was second in Europe only to that of Great Britain, and it was almost five times that of France.

Most of the German bituminous coal production was from the coalfields of the Ruhr and Upper Silesia. After these, and at a very much lower level of importance, came the Saar coalfield and the several small coal basins in Saxony and Hannover. Brown coal came mainly from near Cologne and from the extensive fields east of the river Elbe. All the major coalfields lay, for geological reasons that have already been explained, close to the margin of the northern plain, and thus they were accessible to water-borne commerce. All the late nineteenth and twentieth century canals had as a primary objective to facilitate and even to extend the area of the distribution of coal.

The concurrent development of transportation facilities prevented the drift of industries toward the coalfields. It did not prevent the emergence of a number of industrial regions, each characterized by a peculiar and distinctive association of industries. The pattern of distribution of the metallurgical industries was most clearly influenced by the existence of natural resources and transportation facilities, and the two most important and most concentrated of Germany's industrial regions were based overwhelmingly on mining and on the metallurgy of iron and steel.

THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES

Iron-working may be regarded as originally almost a German art. The blast furnace was itself evolved in West Germany, and many of the early methods of making and refining iron were developed in Germany. On the other hand, many of the modern advances in metallurgy were introduced from Great Britain or France, reflecting Germany's economic backwardness during the middle years of the nineteenth century. The earliest modern iron industry, using coke to smelt ore in large blast furnaces and to refine (by puddling) and rolling the iron, developed in Upper Silesia, where there were fewer restrictions on its growth. It was owned and operated either

by the Prussian State or by the landed aristocracy. Only late in the century did the joint-stock company (*Aktiengesellschaft*) make its appearance as an instrument of economic development. In its business organization the Ruhr area was more advanced than Upper Silesia, but technologically it was somewhat slower to develop. Over half a century separated the earliest use of coke for smelting in Upper Silesia from the first successful experiments (1849) in the Ruhr. The craft organization of West German industry and the conservatism of the craftsman were certainly factors which contributed to this slower industrial growth in the lower Rhineland. But the abundance of good quality coke, combined with technical education which was vigorously developed by the Prussian State and the greater freedom of trade that resulted from the Zollverein, gave an impetus to industrial growth in the Ruhr area that made it by the end of the century the foremost center of iron and steel manufacture in the Old World.

The Ruhr coalfield had a unique advantage (see map 3). It bordered the Rhine, and in the plain to the north of the coalfield the physical conditions made the construction of artificial waterways relatively easy. It was thus possible to use water transportation almost from the start in the bulk handling of goods. The local reserves of iron-ore, which occurred among the coal deposits, were soon exhausted and were supplemented by ores imported from Spain, North Africa, Brazil, Newfoundland and above all from Sweden. It was high-grade Swedish ore, imported by sea, transhipped in the ports of Rotterdam or Emden and brought by barge to the Ruhr that, combined with the high-grade Ruhr coking coal, laid the foundations of its prosperity.

The enterprise, business acumen and technical knowledge of the Ruhr industrialist at the end of the nineteenth century contrasted strongly with the sluggishness of his predecessor only a couple of generations earlier. The Ruhr was a center of iron and steel manufacture. The fabrication of these materials was less important, and half-finished steel goods were sent in large quantities to the automobile and engineering industries of Berlin, Bavaria and Saxony.

In 1871 Germany annexed Alsace and a large part of Lorraine.

The latter had abundant reserves of iron ore, but there is no reason to suppose that greed for these resources was a factor influencing the German action. Indeed, it was not until the invention of the basic process of steel-making eight years later that the true value of these ores became apparent. The possession of the coal of the Ruhr and the iron-ore of Lorraine gave Germany, at least for a time, a dominant position in the European iron and steel industry. It is not true to say that Lorraine became tributary to the Ruhr. Lorraine ore has a low metallic content, not generally more than 30 per cent of iron, and ores as poor as this cannot usually be transported far without serious financial loss. The Ruhr came to depend to an increasing extent on iron ore from Sweden, and only comparatively small quantities of Lorraine ore ever entered the furnace charges of the Ruhr iron industry. It proved to be most profitable to smelt the Lorraine ore in Lorraine. The nearest source of fuel at this time¹⁴ was the Saar coal basin, the coal from which was not of normal coking quality and could not be used, without blending and processing, as a basis for coke manufacture. Lorraine was thus obliged to depend upon the Ruhr for the bulk of its fuel supply, whereas the Ruhr never relied upon Lorraine for ore. It is important to understand this relationship, because much has been made in Germany of the "organic" relationship of the Ruhr with Lorraine. This alleged mutual dependence was urged as a reason for not restoring Lorraine to France in 1919 and was used to condone subsequent German claims to the restoration of the area. Lorraine continues to need the coal of the Ruhr, but the converse has never been true.

The Saarland, on the western border of Germany and only 30 miles from the Lorraine iron-ore deposits, might seem the obvious source of fuel for the iron industry of Lorraine. Unfortunately the Saar basin does not include coal of true coking quality, and its own industrial development was restricted by the limitations imposed by the *quality* of its fuel supply. Notwithstanding this, France was given a fifteen year lease of the Saar coal mines by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, a lease which terminated in 1935 with

¹⁴ The extension of this coalfield into Lorraine has since been opened up.

the restoration of the Saar Territory to Germany. Despite the limitations of fuel quality, the Saar developed a small smelting and steel industry. Its proximity to the Lorraine ore deposits and the availability of fuel locally were sufficiently advantageous to overcome the technical disadvantages of the latter.

Up to the time of the Second World War, the second most important center both of coal mining and of iron smelting and steel working was in Upper Silesia. The fuel is less suitable for metallurgical use than that of the Ruhr, and this disadvantage could be overcome in part only by keeping the blast-furnaces small. Ore deposits were never large and by the end of the nineteenth century had become exhausted. Upper Silesia was obliged henceforward to depend upon ore supplies brought in from Scandinavia, from the Carpathian region and even from sources outside Europe. This was, however, scarcely more disadvantageous than the position of the Ruhr. The chief obstacle in the way of a greater industrial development in Upper Silesia lay in its distance from the main consuming centers of its products, both in Germany and the rest of Europe. The Borsig concern of Berlin had established a smelting and refining works in Upper Silesia in the middle of the nineteenth century for the purpose of supplying its Berlin factories with raw materials. This was about as far as the Upper Silesian industries could count on selling their goods, at least in competition with the Ruhr. Even in Berlin, Upper Silesian coal fought a losing battle for the coal market against Ruhr coal brought by barge along the Mittelland Canal. At the peace settlement which followed the First World War, a portion of the Upper Silesian coalfield and industrial area was transferred to Poland. The loss of this territory was bitterly resented in Germany. It was argued that the resources and industry of this area were necessary to the German economy, while they were not needed by Poland. Events had already shown that the only part of the East German market which Upper Silesia could count on dominating was mainly rural, with only a small demand for the products of Upper Silesian industries. After 1921, when the Upper Silesian area was partitioned between Germany and Poland, the capacity of the iron and steel industry was actually reduced in

the German sector of the area, and the coal mines, except during the Second War, were never worked to capacity.

This discussion of the three major coalfield areas of Germany has been prolonged because of its relevance to an appraisal of certain territorial claims that have been made against Germany. Three conclusions may be drawn from it. In the first place, the Ruhr coalfield had grown to be a resource of vital importance not only to the whole German economy, but also to that of much of Western Europe. Secondly, the significance of the Saar has been somewhat overrated in political literature. Its own industries are dependent upon Lorraine ore. On the other hand its coal, while useful to France in the 1920's and '30's, is not now essential. The market for the Saar coal, the total production of which does not exceed 15 million tons a year, is mainly in South-west Germany. Thirdly, despite German protestations to the contrary, Upper Silesia could never dominate more than a very small part of the German market for coal, steel and engineering products. Insofar as it may be said to have a 'natural' market this lay to the east, in Poland and the middle and lower Danubian basins. The relevance of this circumstance will be discussed in the next chapter.

THE METAL-USING INDUSTRIES

The engineering industries passed from a craft to a factory basis relatively late. A consequence of this is that these branches of industry are oriented toward the consumer rather than toward the source of raw materials. Certain branches of heavy engineering, such as the production of heavy castings, ship and boiler plates and structural steel were established in the Ruhr, but most other branches are widely dispersed. Berlin became the most important center of the electrical engineering industries; agricultural machinery was made in Saxony and the lower Rhineland. Locomotives and railroad equipment were built in Kassel, Breslau and Berlin; automobiles, trucks and light mechanical engineering products in Munich, Stuttgart, Nürnberg and other cities of South Germany. Schweinfurth, on the river Main, became the chief source of ball-bearings. This wide dispersion of the mechanical and engineering

industries necessitated, as has already been noted, a vigorous internal trade and exchange of goods between the many centers of industry. If these centers are represented on a map, and flow symbols used to show the movement of materials in various degrees of manufacture, most of Germany is shown to be laced by such movements. Only east of the Oder would such ties seem to be weaker. Apart from Upper Silesia and the Breslau (Wrocław) region, the part of Germany which lay beyond the line of the rivers Oder and Neisse had very little manufacturing industry and provided a market of very limited extent for industrial products.

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES

These are also distributed over most of Germany. The most important centers of manufacture were in the lower Rhineland, especially in Krefeld, München-Gladbach and Wuppertal; in Baden, Württemberg and the alpine foothills of South Germany; in Bielefeld in the northern plain; in Plauen, Chemnitz (Karl-Marx Stadt) and other cities of Saxony and in a multitude of little towns along the edge of the Silesian mountains. The industry was specialized as well as widely dispersed. Separate areas concentrated not merely on a single branch of the textile industry, on silk or cottons, for example, but often also on a single stage in the manufacturing process. Yarn moved from spinning to weaving areas, and cloth from the weavers to dyers and finishers, before at last it made its way to the warehouses of a dealer in Berlin or in one of the other great cities of Germany. Thus was established an interdependence between the hundreds of separate centers of textile production.

THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

Owing to their dependence upon a limited range of naturally occurring minerals, the chemical industries were rather more narrowly localized than the textile. The Ruhr coalfield, with its coke ovens and related coal-tar byproducts, was a major localizing factor. Many of the largest undertakings were established where bulky raw materials such as coal and coal products could reach them easily: at Leverkusen, Mannheim and Ludwigshafen on the Rhine. The

potash and other salt deposits of Saxony, as well as the extensive deposits of lignite, served to help locate an important heavy chemicals industry here.

INDUSTRIAL REGIONS (SEE MAP 3)

In spite of their wide dispersion over Germany, there nevertheless stand out a number of relatively restricted industrial areas, in each of which there is a heavy preponderance of manufacturing industries. Foremost is the Ruhr-Lower Rhineland area with, before the Second World War, about a fifth of the total German industrial employment. The Upper Saxony industrial region, with a somewhat more varied industrial composition, provided employment for another fifth of the total German industrial population. The Saxon industrial region was more varied in its industrial structure. Bituminous coal reserves were small, but were supplemented by brown coal, and the area had abundant reserves of potash and other salts. The metallurgical industries were less important than in the Ruhr-Rhineland region, but the chemical, light engineering and textile industries were more so.

Next in importance come two smaller industrial regions: the middle Rhineland, the area stretching from Frankfurt to Stuttgart and containing Mainz, Ludwigshafen, Mannheim and Karlsruhe, and the city of Berlin itself. Neither of these areas has important power resources or reserves of other industrial raw materials. Both fabricate raw materials brought into the area. Apart from the chemical industries along the middle Rhine, the industries of these regions are mainly "light," and include printing, light engineering and instrument-making, the manufacture of furniture and of a wide range of consumers goods. The industries of these two regions had a market which embraced the whole of Germany, and their success was dependent upon transportation and exchange within Germany. Exports also absorbed a part of the products, and these were usually shipped by rail to the ports of North Germany or the Rhine mouth.

Upper Silesia and the Saar constituted for Germany before the Second World War two relatively highly specialized industrial regions whose importance was great only in eastern and south-

western Germany respectively. Alone among the more important industrial regions of Germany, they did not command a market that was co-terminous with the Reich. Both lay on the border of Germany, and for each the largest potential market lay outside Germany.

Lastly, scattered over much of the country were cities, many with highly specialized branches of industry, which produced for the German and also the export market. One can mention only a few: the ports of Bremen, Hamburg and Kiel; the cities of the northern plain such as Hannover, Braunschweig (Brunswick), Magdeburg; South Germany cities such as Nürnberg and Munich. Many highly specialized and vitally important industries were located in quite small cities, the manufacture of ball-bearings in Schweinfurth, for example.

This short review of the geography of Germany's industry before the Second World War emphasizes its dominant character, its wide dispersion over the country, the intensity of exchange between one province and another and the extreme importance of that transportation net which, by rail, road and water, had allowed this dispersed pattern to come into being.

CARTELS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

The development of modern industry in Germany was paralleled by the emergence of cartels. These were in origin associations of producers formed for the purposes of maintaining prices and cushioning the results of fluctuations in demand. But in many industries association between producers went very much farther than this; joint selling organizations were set up, so that the industry as a whole appeared to the consumer as a monopoly. Such selling organizations were particularly important in the coal, iron and steel industries, but "by 1900 there was hardly a trade which had not its Kartell, strong or weak, from needles, sewing machines, and skates to copper, chloroform, soap, sporting ammunition, sole leather, shoes, flax, hemp, shoddy, dyeing in its many branches and the making of perambulators."¹⁵ Nor did German trade associations stop at this

¹⁵ John H. Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany*. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1945, p. 314.

horizontal organization of industry. A vertical association of industries was also established, a producer reaching back to control the sources of its raw materials and forward to embrace its own markets. This type of organization became typical of the iron and steel industries, for which it was particularly appropriate, but it also came to characterize many others. Thus an iron and steel firm might get possession of ore reserves, coal mines, coke ovens and limestone quarries and, at the other end, have an interest in ship-building, automobile and locomotive construction, engineering and other industries which used its products as raw materials for their own fabricating branches of industry. A similar vertical integration came to characterize the chemical, coal-mining and many other branches of German industry. This *integration* in both directions, horizontal and vertical, which characterized the industry of Germany to a greater degree than that of any other country, was in some measure a conscious reaction to the excessive fragmentation of industry which existed until quite late in the nineteenth century. To some extent also it was an attempt to overcome the fact that other industrial countries already enjoyed the advantages of an earlier start and of an established market when the industrialization of Germany began.

But the vast concentrations of economic power such as existed in the German cartels and combines aroused only fear and hostility among Germany's political and economic rivals. The democracies have always distrusted monopoly control, and when the controlling power was seen to be allied with an aggressive government, suspicions were intensified. A varied and highly developed industrial potential is an important ingredient in political power. This was realized at the end of the First World War, though no overt attempt was made to control industry. "The German Empire," wrote John Maynard Keynes,¹⁶ "has been built more truly on coal and iron than on blood and iron." German industrialists were commonly blamed for the German policy of aggression to which, it was alleged, they gave powerful support. It is true that industrial groups did nothing to oppose German militarization and aggression;

¹⁶ John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Macmillan and Co., London, 1919, pp. 74-75.

nor, for that matter, did any other significant group. During the years between the First and Second World Wars, it was not unusual in the democracies to link an aggressive policy with the self-interest of industrialists in general and of armament manufacturers in particular. Some color was given to this supposition by the public statements of Krupp von Bohlen and Fritz Thyssen. The former claimed to have produced arms beneath the not very searching gaze of the British officials of the allied commission of control, disguising them as simple articles of domestic use. But this and many similar claims were little more than the attempts of little men to justify their record in the eyes of the Nazi party. Secret re-armament did take place, but the villains were more likely to have been General von Seeckt and Gustav Stresemann, who formulated policy, than the industrialists who probably had little success in influencing it.

Nevertheless, the idea took firm root that a significant factor in Germany's armament before the First World War and rearmament before the Second, as well as in the shaping of Germany's policy of aggression, was played by the industrialists. Morgenthau would have reduced Germany to a country of happy pastoralists, so intent on their cows that they would have had no time or inclination for aggression. So foolish and romantic a view was fortunately never put to the test. Nevertheless, attempts were made after 1945 to reduce the level of German industry, to prohibit certain branches and to take control of it out of the hands of the former industrialists.

GERMAN AGRICULTURE

Agriculture, no less than industry, had been compartmentalized. In most respects Germany had been self-sufficing in the pre-industrial age. Only foodstuffs of tropical or subtropical origin needed to be imported, and one of these, sugar, began early in the nineteenth century to be supplied from the beet fields of Saxony. Germany remained, on balance, self-sufficing in the essential foodstuffs until the 1870's, when the rise in population and the growing size of industrial cities at last overtook domestic supplies.

Until quite late in the nineteenth century, German agriculture had generally been backward. Then the consolidation of the strips

in the open fields, the increasing use of fertilizer, now manufactured on a massive scale in German chemical factories, the more scientific study of crops and crop rotations brought about an improvement in agriculture that matched the contemporary development in industry. West Germany remained, on the whole, a region of small farms; East Germany, one of large estates. It has often been assumed that the great estates, owned by the Prussian aristocracy, were models of advanced agricultural technique, and further that their production came to be necessary for the food supply of the industrial centers of West Germany. In fact, the landed interests had succeeded in 1880 in erecting a tariff barrier against imported grain, and without this protection their barley, rye and sugar-beets might not have sold as well as they did. After about 1880 the grain import became quite large; it entered mainly through the ports of Rotterdam, Bremen and Hamburg and was mostly distributed in western Germany. The grain surplus of the German East on the whole was used to supply Berlin and the large cities of Saxony. Only in small and far from essential quantities did eastern grain and animal products move to industrial western Germany. Yet the alleged interdependence of West and East Germany, the latter producing the food supply of the former, was one of the arguments used against too radical a political surgery in Germany (see page 17). It was a fallacious argument. There was, inevitably, much interdependence among the regions of Germany, but it was a short-distance relationship: the Lower Rhineland with Westphalia, the middle Rhineland with Bavaria. There was, in fact, a strip running roughly southward from near Lübeck into northern Bavaria, *across* which there was little movement of German-produced foodstuffs. This strip came, through the accident of allied policy, to be picked as the East—West zonal boundary, which thus came, through no fault of its authors, to follow a “natural” division in this regard.

GERMANY IN ITS EUROPEAN SETTING

In the previous pages there has been traced the broad outlines of the emergence of Germany as a cohesive, industrialized, modern state. This happened within a very short span of time; most of this

process was completed during the years when Bismarck was Chancellor. During these years economic links were forged among the many states and provinces of Germany so that they came to constitute an integrated whole. At the same time similar bonds were forged between Germany and her neighbors. It is well known that the greater part of the foreign trade of the developed and industrialized nations is not with the underdeveloped producers of primary goods, but with other developed nations. In this way a mutual dependence gradually developed between Germany and other European nations. In the words of Keynes: "Round Germany as a central support the rest of the European economic system grouped itself, and on the prosperity and enterprise of Germany the prosperity of the rest of the Continent mainly depended. The increasing pace of Germany gave her neighbors an outlet for their products, in exchange for which the enterprise of the German merchant supplied them with their chief requirements at a low price."¹⁷

The iron and steel industry of eastern France, the port activity at Rotterdam and agricultural production in Scandinavia are only some of the activities in other European countries that depended on German markets or German materials. The pattern of exchange was shaken by the First World War, but it was not destroyed. Something resembling the prewar pattern emerged once again after the war was over, the blockade had been lifted and passions had been allowed to cool. In 1938, considerably more than half of Germany's total foreign trade was with European countries (excluding the U.S.S.R.). The theme of Keynes' famous book on the peace treaties of 1919 was the economic unity of Europe, for which a prosperous Germany was essential. On the whole, during the 1920's this view of Germany as an integral part of the European economy seems to have dominated western thinking on the German problem. It contributed to the Dawes Plan of 1924 for the payment of reparations and war debts and to the cooperation between Germany and her western allies during the period of Stresemann. But at intervals the contrary view of Germany as the "eternal aggressor," whose resources for aggression should be drastically pruned, asserted itself.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Clearly, this latter view was dominant during the period of the Second World War and during the postwar period (see chapter 5) when the German "concerns" were broken up and restrictions placed on the level of industry.

While Germany had developed close commercial relations with all her neighbors, her relationship was especially intimate with those lying to the east. On the west Germany was bordered by countries that were industrialized like herself; to the east lay predominantly agricultural and underdeveloped lands, where development had been inhibited for long periods by invasion, conquest and war. ". . . by the system of 'peaceful penetration' she gave these countries not only capital, but, what they needed hardly less, organization. The whole of Europe east of the Rhine thus fell into the German industrial orbit, and its economic life was adjusted accordingly." There was scarcely an industrial undertaking east of Germany that did not owe much to German initiative, capital and experience. German entrepreneurs set up the textile industry at Łódź, then in Russian territory. At Chomutov, in Bohemia, the Mannesmann firm established a subsidiary. The Sosnowiec and other iron works in Russian Poland were founded by Upper Silesian industrial interests. The Slav lands came thus to have a thin scatter of industrial undertakings, all of them inspired in one way or another from Germany. But this was also a two-way process. After about 1880 Germany began to import foodstuffs in increasing quantities. Part of this came from the east: wheat from the Danubian region; rye from Poland. With their *penchant* for systematizing and organizing, the Germans began to plan this commercial relationship between Germany and her eastern neighbors. A somewhat vaguely defined area of Central and Eastern Europe came to be thought of as an exclusively German sphere of operation. Such was the view expressed by Friedrich Naumann in his book on Central Europe. "The German economic creed," he wrote, "must become in future more and more the characteristic of Mid-Europe. . . . A united economic people will develop, cutting across all constitutional boundaries."¹⁸ And how far

¹⁸ Friedrich Naumann, *Mittleuropa*, Berlin, 1916; translated as *Central Europe*, P. S. King and Son, London, 1916, p. 123.

east will its boundaries extend? "Whether they will pass on the inner or the outer side of Roumania, or on this or that side of Besarabia? Whether they will follow the Vistula or not? Whether Bulgaria is to be included in the Central European sphere of interest. . . . Thus there are a hundred questions which will still remain to be answered."¹⁹

They were answered by the German conquest of Eastern Europe during the First World War, but the system then established was quickly overthrown by the peace treaties of 1919 and 1920. In the 1930's a fresh attempt to build an economic empire in Eastern Europe was made by Hjalmar Schacht, the German commerce minister. "By subjecting parts of Europe, in particular the small countries of Central and south-Eastern Europe, to German political and economic domination, they hoped to enlarge Germany's *Lebensraum*, to increase the area and sources of supply on which Germany could depend in times of war, and thus reduce still further the danger of being starved into submission by her enemies."²⁰ For a few years Germany dominated the trade of her eastern neighbors, especially the Danubian states, forcing them into a commercial mold prepared for them in Berlin. Then, with the Second World War and the Russian invasion this German realm collapsed like the house of cards that in reality it was.

Indeed, the invasions of Central Europe of 1944-45, from both west and east, brought all movement except the flow of refugees to a standstill. With trade halted, the fields in part abandoned, the cities in ruins and the factories either idle or wrecked, that industrialized, integrated and cohesive Germany which had been built up during the previous century had disappeared. The map had been wiped clean by the bombing and the destruction of what man had put upon it. It was for new people to write afresh a new pattern upon the map of nature's resources.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

²⁰ Heinz W. Arndt, *The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties*, Oxford, 1944, p. 179.

The Political Geography of Modern Germany

ON November 11, 1918, peace broke out in Europe. Issues which had been suppressed for decades, if not centuries, by the power of the German, Austrian and Russian Empires were at once brought to the surface by the military collapse of the empires themselves. Problems became more numerous and more complex. This had been recognized by Woodrow Wilson when, in the Fourteen Points and related statements, he tried to define the foundations of a lasting peace. It was also demonstrated by the great length and the many technical issues of the Treaty of Versailles and of the other treaties of peace that were negotiated at Paris in 1919-20.

Amid the complexity of claim and counterclaim, of assertions of ancient rights and traditional missions, one can detect three basic principles, mutually contradictory more often than not, that were applied to the territorial settlement of Europe. The first was nationalism. Woodrow Wilson had stressed in no uncertain terms his conviction that the peoples of Austria-Hungary "should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development," that the Polish state should be re-established and should "include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations," and that the wrong done to France by Prussia's seizure of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 should be rectified. Wilson believed that these problems of nationalism could be solved, now that the empires of Central Europe were defeated and humiliated. He believed that claims based on nationhood were simple to understand and easy to apply, given only a degree of goodwill between the nations themselves. In Eastern Europe the complexity of national claims combined in some areas with the

violence and in others with the vagueness of national feeling to make Wilson's remedy a very difficult one to apply.

The boundaries which the Wilsonian doctrine of nationalism allowed to Germany were by no means clearcut. National allegiance did not necessarily accord with differences of language, and where it did so, the line separating German from Pole or German from Dane was by no means a simple one. Whatever boundary might be established, groups of one nation were certain to be found on the other side of the line. In some areas a plebiscite was ordered, but even here, in the confused and uncertain political conditions of the immediate post-war years, many a voter was influenced by his head rather than his heart, voting for the state with what seemed the more stable government, rather than for that which represented what may be termed his spiritual interests.

The second principle was that the states newly arrived upon the political map should be viable. They should have the resources not only to feed and employ themselves, but also to protect themselves from attack. If participation in world trade were necessary—as in every instance, in fact, it was—they had a right to the reasonable use of such facilities as nature and man had combined to create. France's temporary need for German coal, Poland's access to the sea, Czechoslovakia's—and also Austria's and Hungary's—need for an unrestricted right to use the ocean ports of their neighbors, the obligation to allow the shipping of other nations to use one's navigable waterways: such rights were, in many instances, guaranteed by the treaties of peace which ended the First World War. In others, they were the subject of post-war conferences and conventions. Wilson conceived of a civilized community of nations, infused with a kind of utilitarianism, among which resources and facilities were to be used for the greatest good of the greatest number.

Lastly, commerce was viewed as the lifeblood of the community of nations. Freedom of the seas, the right of transit across the territory of neighboring states, the removal of barriers to trade and the establishment of an equality of commercial conditions all were seen

to be essential. Greed, jealousy and fear restricted the application of the Wilsonian doctrine. J. M. Keynes regarded the role of Germany in the commerce of Europe and of the world as so vital that any attempt to reduce Germany's participation or potential could be expected to have disastrous consequences for the rest of the world. The peace treaties did not fully reflect the opinions of Keynes. It is a purely academic question whether the subsequent course of events in Central Europe would have been radically different if more attention had been paid his warnings. Different in detail they would certainly have been, but it is unlikely that the roots of Nazism are to be found in the punitive and financial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

THE MAP OF GERMANY: 1919

On the basis of the general principles that have just been outlined, Germany was required in the Treaty of Versailles to surrender not only her overseas dependencies, but also 15,399 square miles of her own *Reichsboden* to her neighbors. Both these territorial changes were bitterly resented in Germany. The loss of over a million square miles of overseas dependent territories, it was claimed, violated the second of the principles on which the peace settlement was predicated: it deprived Germany of essential raw materials, and to that extent it threatened her viability. This claim is overstated. Germany's dependence upon her colonies was minimal. Their value to Germany was chiefly strategic, and in the brave new world that was being fashioned at Paris in 1919 strategic bases were no longer thought to be necessary.

Even greater exception was taken to the loss of *German* territory. These losses may be grouped under five heads (See map 4):

1. ALSACE-LORRAINE

This territory had been annexed in 1871. It had great economic value to Germany, though that value (see page 58) was not quite what German apologists and others have represented it to have been. The population was predominantly German in speech, though never wholly assimilated to the German state.

2. SAAR TERRITORY

France needed the coal, at least temporarily, until the mines in *Pas de Calais* and *Nord* could be restored to production. The population was almost wholly German in language, and certainly it was more German in sympathy than French. The compromise reached in 1919 was to allow France a fifteen year lease of the mines, while the territory itself was given an administration responsible to the League of Nations. At the end of fifteen years the people of the Saar were to determine their future destiny by popular vote.

3. LUXEMBOURG AND BELGIUM

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was formally a part of the German Empire, though it lay within the German customs union. At the end of the First World War its fiscal connection with Germany was severed. The severance of Luxembourg's association with Germany did not in reality constitute a transfer of territory, but a few miles farther to the north, Germany was obliged to cede to Belgium the small but important territories of Eupen and Malmédy.

4. SCHLESWIG

Prussia had occupied the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein in 1864. By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles a plebiscite was held in northern Schleswig, and much of this area was retroceded to Denmark.

5. PRUSSIA, POSEN AND SILESIA

The most radical changes of boundary were in the east, where the state of Poland in 1919 took over about 17,800 square miles of former German territory. Germany accepted none of the boundary changes gracefully but opposition was most vehement to the loss of these lands which, the Germans claimed, they had tamed and brought within the sphere of western civilization.

The eastern boundary of Germany became, it was claimed, an ethnic one. At no point was it easy to establish, but over much of this distance it did violence to nothing more than the pride and the

traditions of the German people. In four areas its delimitation was especially difficult. The first of these, the port of Memel, was not really the concern of Poland. It was the only maritime commercial outlet for the new state of Lithuania, but its population was largely German. It was, after a period of uncertainty, incorporated into Lithuania.

The second disputed area was along the southern border of the German province of East Prussia. The German invaders and settlers had entered through the northern ports and had fanned out over the morainic hill-country lying to the south. They had never settled densely in the more southerly districts of Allenstein (Olsztyn) and Marienwerder (Kwidzyn). The confusion of Polish and German settlement led the allies to provide for a plebiscite in this area. The voting was heavily in favor of Germany, as elements of the Polish speaking population, especially those of the Lutheran creed, were attracted by the political stability of the German Reich.

The third and perhaps the most critical of all the boundary problems was the so-called "Corridor." The "Corridor" area, sometimes called West Prussia, had never been densely settled by Germans, and despite islands of German speech the area was predominantly Polish. It was probably for this reason, rather than for any claim to access to the sea, that Poland acquired the area. This however raised two further difficulties. The "Corridor" separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Railway traffic between the two parts of Germany had to cross Polish territory. Although the main transit routes were "privileged," and neither travellers nor freight was subject to customs and other formalities, the Germans complained bitterly of the alleged insult of having to cross a foreign soil. The other difficulty was the port of Danzig (Gdańsk). Too German to be incorporated into Poland and too vital to Poland to be allowed to go with East Prussia, Danzig constituted one of the more vital and controversial issues before the peace conference. The clumsy solution reached was to establish the city and its surrounding territory—an area of 754 square miles—as a Free City; in most respects self-governing, but subject to the overall authority of the League of Nations. The anti-Polish feelings of the Danzigers were manifested almost

from the start and were to intensify in the following twenty years.

The last area of dispute was Upper Silesia. The whole of Silesia had been Germanized only in comparatively recent times, and in Upper Silesia the degree of Germanization reflected the social stratification of the people. The rural areas had remained Polish. The coal miners and industrial workers were mostly Poles, but government officials, technicians and the whole managerial class were mainly German. Here, least of all, could a simple line be drawn to separate German from Pole. Poland claimed the whole industrial area, arguing that to divide it would gravely reduce its effectiveness. After a plebiscite and two serious outbreaks of fighting, the industrial area was partitioned by a committee appointed by the former allies for this purpose. The boundary was made to follow the pattern of voting, as far as possible ignoring technical considerations of the industries and public utilities. The boundary was an unsatisfactory one from all points of view, and it worked only because the two sides arrived at an intricate agreement to treat the industrial area as in many respects a single unit.

6. AUSTRIA AND THE SUDETENLAND

Germany was not, even before the First World War, the only German-speaking state in Central Europe. German was also the language of Austria proper, of two-thirds of Switzerland, of a part of Czechoslovakia and of small areas in Italy and the Danubian and Southeast European states. To most of these Germany has in some way laid claim, though in none was the claim made good except during the Nazi period. The re-absorption of Austria into the German state, from which in effect she had been expelled in 1866, was specifically forbidden by the terms of the peace treaties. Even the legality of a customs union between Germany and Austria was denied by the Permanent Court of International Justice. Incorporation of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia into Germany was never in question. The territory had been part of Austria and previously had been included within the Kingdom of Bohemia. Though contiguous with Germany, the German-speaking Sudetenland became part of Czechoslovakia, the heir to the Bohemian kingdom.

The above summary of the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles would be incomplete without mention of the remaining punitive clauses of the treaty. The military clauses restricted the size and equipment of the German army. The German navy was reduced to negligible proportions; Germany west of the Rhine was garrisoned by an allied army. Germany was called upon in signing the treaty to accept the responsibility, with her allies, for having begun the war, and upon this "war-guilt clause" was predicated Germany's obligation to pay reparation for the damage she had caused.

There is neither space nor, perhaps, the necessity to discuss further these clauses of the treaty and the ways in which they were either alleviated by the actions of the Allies, as in the settlement of reparation claims and the evacuation of the Rhineland, or evaded by the Germans themselves, with their para-military police and secret rearmament.

For the first fifteen years Germany was governed as a democratic republic. For the next twelve, up to the debacle of 1945, Germany was an authoritarian state, subject to the whim of a paranoic genius named Adolf Hitler and the gang of thugs that surrounded him. It is fruitless to discuss the reasons for the failure of the democratic Germany of the Weimar Republic, unless from it some lessons can be derived on how to prevent for the future a revival of German militarism.

Perhaps the happening of greatest significance to the internal development of Germany during this period was inflation, which began almost as soon as the war had ended, gained impetus and culminated in 1923 in the most disastrous currency collapse in history. It wiped out at once the savings of the middle class and the obligations of the industrialists. It removed the middle from German society and destroyed the political influence of that sector which was most interested in preserving the conservative, democratic state which had been created by the Weimar Constitution. Its consequences were masked for a few years by the relative prosperity of Germany in the late 'twenties, but it took only the depression, with its attendant mass unemployment, to reveal the shocking weakness of the socio-political order that had been left.

The bulk of the German people had probably never reconciled itself to the *Diktat* of Versailles and was unwilling to believe that it had in fact suffered military defeat. Somewhere in the minds of most Germans there lurked the hope that Germany would someday be able to denounce the punitive clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, regain its lost territories and possessions and re-establish itself as the dominant military and political force in Central Europe. France, the state most likely to resist a German revival, had entered into alliances with Germany's Slavic neighbors to the east. Together they encircled Germany, and the alleged French *Einkreisungspolitik* was used in Germany as evidence of the continuing hostility of France and her allies. How to detach France from her alliance with Poland and Czechoslovakia and how to prevent a renewal of France's earlier alliance with Russia became the problems of German diplomacy.

The temporary settlement of the reparation problem and the general conditions of greater economic prosperity and economic stability contributed to a relaxation of tension in the west. Stresemann, the German Chancellor from 1925 to 1929, profited from this to negotiate the Locarno Treaty of 1925. Germany, France, Great Britain and their western allies agreed to guarantee their mutual boundaries and not to attempt to change them by force. France desired that this guarantee should be extended to her eastern allies, but Great Britain then, as later, was unwilling to underwrite the boundaries in Eastern Europe, and Germany had no intention of keeping her hands off Poland if an opportunity should ever offer of renewed expansion in this direction. Thus did Stresemann sow the seeds of distrust between France and her eastern allies and at the same time hold out to Germans the expectation that the lost lands in the east might some day be restored.

Western Europe emerged for a few years into what Churchill has termed "the pale sunlight of Locarno." It was a deceptive sunshine that illumined that period like the short-lived brightness that sometimes occupies the eye of the storm. The determination of those who shaped German policy to regain at least the territories lost in the east was not abated. Even so, it is doubtful whether events would

have taken the course they did but for the depression and resulting unemployment. In the early 'thirties Germany's situation was desperate and seemed to call for desperate remedies.

Distress brought with it an immense accession of strength to the extreme National Socialist party, which during the prosperous days of Stresemann had been forgotten and had almost ceased to exist. Successive governments failed to cope with a situation rapidly deteriorating until on January 30, 1933, President Hindenburg called upon Adolf Hitler to assume the office of Chancellor and to form a government. Hitler quickly secured himself against the risk of falling, as his immediate predecessors had done, by assuming absolute powers and organizing his party stalwarts to intimidate and liquidate whatever opposition might show itself.

It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the roots of National Socialism. Those roots were, however, well and truly watered and fertilized by German resentment at the territorial and punitive clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, by the inflation and the depression and by the miseries caused by each. We are concerned here only with the stages by which Hitler set aside the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and went on to annex territories to which Germany laid some kind of claim, until at last the sluggish democracies aroused themselves from their apathy and set a limit to Hitler's career of bloodshed and conquest.

Hitler had been nurtured on the same spiritual diet as the majority of Germans of his day. He had merely assimilated it less well than most others, and his indigestion grossly distorted the already crooked picture of the German past that the romantic German imagination had created. If he had ever stopped to examine critically his own ideas, which he never did, he would have found them compounded of Hegel's absolutist views of the state and of Fichte's concept of the German nation, to which was added a great deal of nineteenth century nonsense about race. The tragedy was that Hitler was in the German tradition; his appeal lay, partly at least, in the fact that he was able to relate the miseries and the ills of his time: unemployment, military defeat and loss of territory, to the antecedent concepts of nation, race and the absolutist state. Hitler's policy within Ger-

many from 1933 until his attack on Poland is the subject of numerous and excellent books, some of which are listed at the end of this one. We are concerned here primarily with the territorial expansion of Hitler's *Reich* and with its subsequent disintegration.

THE ROAD TO MUNICH

Hitler acted precipitately. He had been in power in Germany for only a year and a half when he attempted by a military *putsch* to incorporate Austria. He had himself been born in Austria, and, more than most Germans, he regarded Austria as part of Germany. A military coup had for some time been in preparation. The Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, was murdered, but the conspirators failed to seize the crucial organs of government and the uprising was suppressed. The western powers were shocked; Mussolini bristled at this threat to the integrity of his neighbor; Hitler himself professed horror at the dastardly act and walked a little more diplomatically for a few months.

At the beginning of 1935 occurred the Saar plebiscite; the Saarlanders were called upon to choose between incorporation in France, return to Germany and the retention of their present status. The plebiscite had been preceded by an intensive propaganda from Germany, which emphasized the German character of the Saar and the moral obligation of its inhabitants to vote for re-incorporation within Germany. The voting was overwhelmingly in favor of a return to Germany and probably would have been in favor of Germany even without the barrage of propaganda emitted by Goebbels.

This wholly legal triumph of Germany was followed within a couple of months by the reintroduction of conscription and the establishment of an air force. The building of submarines and of capital ships in excess of 10,000 tons had been begun in secret. The nucleus of a General Staff already existed. Within a year Hitler was ready for more forceful steps. In March, 1936, his troops marched into the demilitarized Rhineland, and within a few months they had erected a Western Wall along the Franco-Belgian border that would for the future make it difficult if not impossible for France to come to the aid of her eastern allies.

With this measure of protection in the west, Hitler renewed his attacks in the east. In March, 1938, Austria was occupied by German forces.

The slow stirrings of consciousness in the British government and the formation of a strong left-of-center government in France did not restrain the actions of Hitler. The attack on Austria was followed by a more intensive campaign against Czechoslovakia, by far the most stable and successful of the succession states. But within its borders there lived at this time some three million German-speaking people. They lived in a fairly compact area close to the German border. The German-settled area, which came to be known as the Sudetenland, had been included in Czechoslovakia partly because it formed part of the historic Bohemia, partly because the mountains of the Sudetenland were thought to constitute a good military boundary and partly because of the close economic and technical ties between the Sudetenland and the plains of Central Bohemia.

Hitler and his propaganda ministry dragged out all their old arguments: language is the measure of nationhood; the Sudeten Germans were persecuted by the Czechs, members of an allegedly inferior Slav "race"; peace could be assured only when every German had been incorporated into the *Reich*. Hitler found his instruments inside the Sudetenland, notably a naïve teacher of physical education named Konrad Henlein. Through their own folly the western powers had sacrificed even the means of aiding Czechoslovakia, and they soon began even to find Hitler's demands not altogether unreasonable. France defaulted on her treaty obligations, and to Great Britain, which had no specific obligations, Czechoslovakia was a distant and little-known country. Thus at Munich, on September 29, 1938, France and Great Britain agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The German-settled areas, liberally interpreted, were incorporated into the *Reich*. Slovakia broke away to form a separate republic, and what remained of the Czechoslovakia state was a small, unviable unit.

The Sudeten lands, like the Austrian, were quickly digested into Hitler's *Reich*, and scarcely was this process completed when

Hitler turned to his next conquest, the absorption of the Czech lands as well. Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, became "protectorates" of Germany and were quickly reduced to an entirely dependent status. The path was now clear for the attack on Poland. Though less industrialized than Czechoslovakia, Poland was larger and more populous, and her people had a tradition of strenuous resistance to invaders. But Germany held western Poland as in a pincer grip.

The western powers were beginning to stir. Great Britain and France had given a guarantee to Poland that they would assist her if attacked, without ever considering how this guarantee could be implemented. They competed somewhat belatedly with Germany for the friendship and alliance of the Soviet Union, but Germany held the trump card: she could offer the Soviet Union almost half of Poland if the Soviet Union for its part would acquiesce in Germany's taking of the remainder. Thus was the stage set for the German invasion of Poland at dawn on September 1, 1939, and for the outbreak of the most costly, the most destructive and perhaps the most critical war in history.

No attempt can be made even to trace in the barest outline the course of events during the six years that followed. The limits of the Reich were extended by the re-incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine in the west and of parts of Poland in the east. Central Poland, including its capital city of Warsaw, became the so-called Government-General, which retained as little freedom and independence of action as the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia. In 1944 this structure began to collapse. The German armies, defeated in North Africa, in France and in Russia, recoiled. Their retreat was slow and dogged. The western armies, from their bases in northern France, fought their way to the Rhine, preceded by the bombing of German cities and means of transportation and accompanied by that destruction which is normal to a military campaign. Crossing the Rhine, they moved on to the Elbe. The Russian forces crossed Poland and advanced to meet those coming from the west. Germany was fought over; its larger and more significant cities were bombed,

and its factories, railroad yards and bridges were destroyed. Very few parts of Germany escaped major damage.

When the war was over not a bridge remained across the Rhine. Although some of the coal mines were in production, every steel works in the Ruhr had suffered damage, and several were beyond the ability of the Germans to repair. There was almost no movement of goods. Factories had ceased to produce, and the whole system of transportation had broken down. Almost the whole population had been uprooted. Some four million had been mobilized in the German armed forces. Part of the population of the larger and more vulnerable cities had been evacuated, and many of those who had stayed now fled before the advancing armies of the allies. The stream of refugees was greatest from the east, where flight seemed preferable to awaiting the arrival of the Red Army. Economically speaking, the slate had been wiped clean; all ties of commerce were broken. When the time came to rebuild the economy, this could assume a different geographical pattern almost as easily as it could its earlier shape. Of course the former cities were rebuilt. The coal-fields, as soon as their equipment could be restored, began again to exercise their former attraction. But new regional and interregional ties developed. Berlin itself, its population reduced from 4,250,000 to about three million and its industrial structure demolished, ceased to be a large market for industrial materials and foodstuffs. In particular, such movement of goods between western and eastern Germany as had taken place before the war began, came to an end, never to redevelop except on a small and unimportant scale.

GERMANY DIVIDED

This was the background to those zonal divisions of Germany that have already been described in the first chapter. The division itself was not well considered, and no one at the time expected it to last for more than a year or two. It has now endured for over fifteen, and there is nothing on the political horizon to suggest that any major change is imminent.

Germany was in 1945 a slate wiped clean by invasion and destruc-

tion. Only in such circumstances could a new political map have been traced and a changed pattern of industry and trade built up. The decision of the Allies to divide Germany into four zones of occupation, the almost casual way in which these boundaries and that between Germany and Poland were delimited and the gradual adjustment of life to them, have been discussed already. Germans have liked to refer to their country as an "organic whole"—*organismus*, implying that the interdependence of its parts was such that it could function only as a unit. The war changed this. Germany has since operated as three units, and at least one of these has functioned very successfully.

THE GERMAN EAST

Maps printed and published in the Democratic Republic, as well as those made in all other Communist countries, show the line of the Oder and Neisse rivers as an international boundary, similar in strength to other European international boundaries. A map printed in the Federal Republic would show the German-Polish boundary as it was established by the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent agreements. The area between this line and the Oder and Neisse rivers would be marked, *Unter polnische Verwaltung*—"under Polish administration." The Democratic Republic has formally recognized that the east German lands are part of the Polish Peoples' Republic; the Federal Republic has not done so, and for internal political reasons it could not possibly do so.

Meanwhile the lands beyond the Oder and Neisse are lost to Germany. Their population before the Second World War was about 8,900,000. Of this, the Poles claim that about one and one quarter millions were Polish in language and sympathy. This total was greatly increased during the war by the settlement in this relatively "safe" area of people evacuated from the bombed cities of Germany. During the winter and spring of 1944-5 there was a flight from this area, first from east Prussia and Pomerania, then from Silesia. By the time that the Russian armies had rolled through, the population was reduced to perhaps a third of what it had been only a few months earlier. The refugees had trekked west, seeking

a home under American or British control rather than remain under Russian.

A small part of this area, about 4,250 square miles, was annexed by the Soviet Union. The reason seems to have been to give the Russians control of the city and port of Königsberg, now renamed Kaliningrad. This portion of the area has been resettled by Russians, while the rest was incorporated into Poland. A movement of Poles into this area began almost as soon as the fighting had ceased. At first it was disorganized, but later Poles from the "lost" Polish territories in the east were moved into the "recovered" territories in the west. To these were added Poles returning from forced labor camps in the west and peasant families from the crowded villages of central Poland. At the same time elements of the former German population that had managed to survive the Russian invasion—and these were quite numerous in the cities—were sent back to Germany. Nevertheless, a trickle of returning Germans has continued until the present.

The changes brought about a sharp fall in the total population, as Polish immigrants failed to make up completely for the Germans who moved out. In this the cities suffered most. In areas where the population was mixed, the German was more numerous in the towns; the Polish in the countryside. In 1946 the population of the Polish "recovered" territories was about five millions. By 1950 it had risen almost to six, and in 1958 it was about 7,411,000. Since 1956 members of the small German community have been given complete freedom to migrate if they wish. A number have taken advantage of this, so that the remaining Germans amount to only a handful and are not distinguished in the official Polish statistics. At present the indigenous population—those people that have remained in these territories from before the Russian invasion and their incorporation into Poland—amount now to a little over a million, almost all of them Polish-speaking.

The Polish re-settlement of their recovered lands has been a major achievement. It has been coupled with a re-occupation of the cities, the most important of which are now larger than they were in 1939. The old industries that have been redeveloped: the steel-working

at Gliwice (Gleiwitz) and Bytom (Beuthen), the engineering at Wrocław (Breslau), the ship-building at Gdańsk (Danzig), the textile industry in Silesia and the cement industry in Opole (Oppeln); and the new industries that have been established: the great chemical combine at Kędzierzyn, the coppersmelting at Legnica and a number of undertakings of lesser importance, have all been integrated with Poland. This area, with its population almost wholly Polish and its industry and agriculture adjusted to the planned needs of Poland, could of course be torn from Poland as it was torn from Germany. But this could not be done without the major surgery of a European and, presumably, a world war, in the course of which the slate would certainly be wiped clean again, leaving a future generation to write what it will.

THE GERMAN WEST

Western Germany was originally conceived as the zones of occupation of the United States and Great Britain, although, as if by an after-thought, a small area was spared to satisfy the *amour-propre* of France. Into these zones came the bulk of the refugees from the East. In stages, beginning in 1947, the three zones were merged into the Federal Republic, and here a combination of circumstances brought about an economic recovery more rapid and more spectacular than any had dared to hope.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

In the year and a half following the end of the war over 9.5 million Germans were expelled from their homes in Eastern Europe. They drifted westward. In 1946 the largest group was in the Soviet Zone, merely because of its geographical proximity to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The French Zone, the most remote, had at this time less than one per cent of the total number of refugees. Gradually, however, the refugees spread themselves more evenly through Germany, as job opportunities and the means of travel became available. To this category of "expellees," *Vertriebenen*, as they were called, there was added another and more miscellaneous group. This

was made up of Germans from the East who, at the time when the war ended, happened to find themselves in West Germany; it contained returned prisoners of war and others whom accident had placed in West Germany. These were "transmigrants," or *Zugewanderte*. This group was enlarged through the following years by the addition of political refugees from Communist rule, the *Flüchtlinge*. The total refugee population in the western zones grew steadily, as shown in the accompanying table.

	<i>Expellees</i>	<i>Transmigrants</i>	<i>Totals</i>
October, 1946	5,963	1,021	6,984
July, 1948	6,997	1,188	8,185
September, 1950	7,876	1,555	9,431
July, 1952	8,175	1,819	9,994
July, 1956	8,656	2,474	11,130
December, 1957	9,148	3,029	12,177

(In thousands: *From International Migration, 1945-1957*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1959, page 9).

Despite internal movement during the past fifteen years, the distribution of refugees is far from even. They are most dense in Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia; least numerous in the former French Zone in the south-west. In 1957 refugees made up 23.5 per cent of the total population of West Germany. During the first few years they lived in conditions of greater hardship and misery than the rest of the German population. Their plight has since been greatly improved and, although some of them have attained managerial positions, the bulk of them have today a lower social status than they had enjoyed before the war. At first they were a burden on the feeble West German economy, and it is probably true to say that in many parts their presence was resented. As late as 1950, unemployment was twice as great among the refugees as among the rest of the population. Since this date their rate of unemployment has declined to approximately the percentage for Germany as a whole, suggesting that economically at least the refugees have been assimilated. But their impact on society and politics remains.

THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

The western powers created the Federal Republic in self-defense. They had undertaken at Potsdam to treat Germany as a single unit for economic purposes and for the payment of reparations. When repeated conferences had failed to bridge the gap between Russian demands and what the western zones were prepared to yield, the American and British authorities agreed to merge their two zones for purposes of economic development (1947). In the next year the French undertook to merge their zone of occupation with those of the United States and Great Britain. There were other points of difference between the Soviet Union and the western powers. The Russians wanted a strong central government in Germany; the western powers aimed to create a weak central authority and a quasi-federal structure of government.

The intransigence of the Soviet Union and the deepening of the rift between it and the western powers served merely to intensify the resolve of the latter to unite the three western zones. Plans for political fusion followed logically from the economic unification of the area; a central authority was necessary to implement decisions regarding economic policy. The plan recently promulgated by General Marshall for European recovery required such an authority. The French, with their traditional fear of a strong German central government, proposed that the *Länder* or provinces should be sovereign, with a weak federal authority. The American and British authorities called for a strong central government with clearly delimited authority and a reserve of powers vested in the *Länder*. The French yielded, though reluctantly and with ill grace, to the Anglo-American point of view. A conference of the western allies was held in London in March, 1947; it invited the German *Land* authorities to draft a federal constitution acceptable to the western powers, as well as to suggest what changes might be made in the boundaries of the *Länder*. The heads of the *Land* governments acted quickly. In the following summer they met and drafted the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) of the Federal Republic. After its

acceptance by the *Länder* and the three western occupying powers it became in the summer of 1949 the constitution of West Germany.

Concurrently an Occupation Statute was drafted reducing and further defining the rights and obligations of the occupying authorities. This was intended to complement the Basic Law. Both came into effect on September 21, 1949, the birthday of the Federal German Republic.

The legal draftsmen of the Federal Republic had designed a constitution that was open-ended in more ways than one. Its federal character allowed for the addition of more federal units; its scope could be extended to all Germany merely by the addition of more federal units. Saarland was, for example, added in 1957. The basic law was open-ended also in a political sense; it sagely provided for the lapse or withdrawal of political power by the occupying authorities and the assumption by the Federal Republic of full sovereignty. In 1949, by the Petersberg Agreement, the Federal Republic began to free itself from some of the restrictions imposed by the Occupational Statute; it was permitted to become a member of international organizations and to establish diplomatic representation abroad. In 1955 the Occupation Statute was revoked, and the Federal Republic formally became a sovereign state.

The federal character of the West German republic was necessitated by the earlier decisions of the allies regarding the future government of Germany. Furthermore, Germany has a tradition of federal government. But German federalism has always differed sharply from American. The federalism of the United States grew out of a democratic tradition. German federalism, by contrast, was aristocratic, and implied an equality among the German princes. These have long since disappeared; the boundaries of the states which they once ruled have been changed almost out of recognition, and the present *Länder*, by and large arbitrary creations, have not been able to focus loyalties or to develop a strong sense of cohesion. They retain legislative autonomy "only in fields where—in Germany—local differences of custom and outlook are of critical importance: education, religion, cultural affairs and local govern-

ment.”²¹ For the rest, the *Land* governments are the instrument for carrying out the decisions of the Federal government.

The federal capital was located in Bonn. In this matter there was little freedom of choice. The more illustrious German cities were either destroyed, like Cologne and Nürnberg, filled with occupation forces, like Frankfurt; or heavily industrialized, like Essen. The small Rhineland city of Bonn seemed to befit a small federal capital, which it was hoped would be shifted soon to Berlin. But the federal capital has become so well established in Bonn; the city has grown to accommodate its guest, and no change is either imminent or contemplated.

THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE

The success with which the refugees have been assimilated and the Basic Law applied would not have been possible without the economic redevelopment of Germany that accompanied them. The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 had prescribed a level of economic activity that would “maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of standards of living of European countries.” At the time standards in Germany were considerably below the European average. Levels of industry were fixed by the occupation authorities, and a beginning was made with the dismantling of redundant industrial capacity. This program was never fully implemented. The raising of production levels and the re-equipment of German industry were begun before dismantling had been completed.

The levels of industry were not the only, or even the primary, obstacle to Germany’s revival. Demand, intensified by the influx of refugees, had long outrun supply. Only the black market flourished; the currency was almost valueless, and saving and investment impossible. The need for currency reform had long been obvious, but no action was possible as long as agreement between the four zonal commanders was prerequisite. The withdrawal of the Rus-

²¹ John F. Golay, *The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p. 28.

sian representative from the Control Council prepared the way for agreement. In June, 1948, the reform took place; the old Reichsmarks were exchanged for the new D-Marks. Illicit hordes acquired by black market manipulation were wiped out, fictitious purchasing power was drained off and a sound currency established at the price of not a little personal hardship. Hoarded goods were forced onto the market; there appeared a new inducement to work. At this point the Marshall Plan, with its operative organ, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, gave the promise of American supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. The Federal government, and in particular its Minister for Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, used heavy indirect taxation in order to hold inflation and to obtain investment capital. Production concentrated on capital goods and durable consumers' goods, in which a large export business was built up. Labor was hard-working and, by American standards, very far from demanding. An attempt to associate representatives with management, so that decisions might be reached jointly, has not been conspicuously successful. Indeed, labor organization has been weak and has not tried seriously and effectively to raise wage levels. It would, in fact, have been difficult to do so. The continued influx of unorganized labor from the East, willing in general to accept employment on the employers' terms, has had a depressing effect on wages.

The role of the refugees in German recovery has been important. At first they were a drag; then they became a very important element in the labor force, especially as many of them were highly skilled in their own crafts. A number of significant branches of industry, such as the manufacture of Bohemian-style glass, cameras and instruments, are very heavily dependent on refugee craftsmen.

When all possible allowance has been made for the significance of American economic policy, for the financial skill of Erhard and for the cyclical upturn in trade, a major factor in German recovery remains the essentially German qualities of discipline and industry. The German economic recovery has been astounding, and "for pace and volume challenges comparison with any period in any country

in the last 200 years.”²² Vast fortunes have been made; rebuilding has, by and large, been completed; shops are full and consumer demand is rising. This prosperity spills over into West Berlin, where the Kurfürstendamm has the glitter of Fifth Avenue. The question which should be asked—and usually is not—is whether recovery has been inhibited by the division of Germany. As has been emphasized earlier, this prosperity has been built up almost from nothing. The division of Germany was part of the background against which it developed. The West German economy as we know it today never had close contacts with that of East Germany, and in fact grew up in isolation from it. To say that West German recovery has been influenced adversely is to say that it could conceivably have been more rapid and more spectacular. The contrary is, in fact, the case. German recovery has been assisted by the division of Germany. Without it there would not have been the asset of the refugee labor force. American aid was in part a reaction to those same forces which helped to divide Germany, and the closer association of the Federal Republic with its West European neighbors in, first, the Coal and Steel Community and, later, the Common Market would again have been inconceivable, at least in the forms which we know, if Germany were undivided and free from the threat of the Soviet Union.

BOUNDARY CHANGES

Several changes have been made since the end of the Second World War in the course of Germany's western boundary. Most of these were of minor importance, however irritating they may have seemed at the time. They constituted “rectifications” of the boundary and were made for technical reasons. In 1946 the Benelux countries claimed 790 square miles of German territory, stretching in small, separate areas from the mouth of the Ems river to Luxembourg. Reasons for the individual claims ranged from land reclamation, drainage and flood control to the improvement of communications and the straightening of unnecessarily complex lengths of boundary.

²² *Overseas Economic Surveys: The Federal Republic of Germany*, London, H.M.S.O., 1955, p. 4.

A six-nation commission recommended in all thirty-one small changes, but only a few of these have been acted upon.

The question of the Saar was in all respects more weighty, though even here it never attained the seriousness of the Berlin problem. The area had returned to Germany after the plebiscite of 1935. In 1945 the Saarland was included within the French zone of occupation. Even without this, there would have been renewed pressure in France for its separation from Germany. The old bases of the French claim were marshalled: historical, strategic, economic. The French objective was to include the Saar within a customs union with France, to separate it politically from Germany and establish there some kind of international administration under French protection. The French proposals were not unattractive to the Saarlanders. Detachment from Germany seemed a small price to pay at that time for freedom from the more onerous restrictions of the allied occupation, for a more stable currency and an adequate food supply. But as the economic situation in Germany improved, loyalty to France began to weaken. Within Germany opposition was aroused, and in France itself the launching of Schuman's plan for a common market in coal and steel seemed to cut away at least the economic reasons for the customs union with France. France's proposal to "Europeanize" the Saar was beginning to have no particular meaning. Finally, the Saarlanders themselves by an overwhelming vote declared their desire to return to Germany. It was easier for France to accept this decision in the better atmosphere of the mid-fifties than it would have been five years earlier, but she nevertheless exacted her price: a concession to continue to work a part of the coalfield for a further twenty-five years and German agreement to assist in the work of canalizing the Mosel river. In January, 1957, the Saarland became a *Land* of the Federal German Republic.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The government of the Federal Republic regards itself as, potentially at least, the government of all Germany. The fact that

its writ does not run in the Democratic Republic it attributes to the machinations of the Soviet Union, and it took care to make public in the preamble to the Basic Law that "it acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied." The establishment of the Federal Republic in West Germany was followed in East by the creation of analogous organs of government. A People's Chamber was created and in 1949 enacted the constitution of the German Democratic Republic. East Germany is a unitary state, with its capital in the East Sector of Berlin. The five *Länder* of which it was originally composed have been replaced by fourteen *Bezirke*, or districts. These political developments, all tending toward the creation of a separate sovereign state, have been bitterly resented in West Germany. The adoption by the eastern republic of the red, gold and black German flag with, as a differentiation, a hammer and compass, appeared like a public announcement of its separate status. The West German Republic refuses to give diplomatic recognition to the East German Republic and threatens to sever relations with any state that does so.

The boundary between the two Germanies is one of the strongest in the world. There are three crossing points, separated from one another by barbed wire and probably also by electrified wire and mine fields. Where roads cross the boundary they are unused, grass-grown, and locked with wire and steel spikes. On both sides of the barrier are green-clad German police, each with field glasses through which he watches the activities of his opposite number beyond the variety of impediments which constitute the Iron Curtain. These police in identical uniforms, speaking the same language, perhaps even related to one another, yet separated by an impenetrable barrier of steel wire, symbolize the present division of Germany.

The Democratic Republic formerly had more than its share of refugees, but many of these were in slow transit toward the West, and the number has greatly diminished. Even so, there were in 1956 about 4,300,000 refugees, about 24 per cent of the total population. These are made up almost entirely of expellees; political refugees from the East obviously do not make their homes in East Germany. The flow of refugees into East Germany has for practical

purposes ceased, and the escape to the West, not only of refugees, but also of native East Germans, is tending to reduce the population. The Democratic Republic is the only country in the world, apart from Ireland, where the population is actually declining.

The refugees have been even more important to East Germany than to West. It proved easier there to absorb a large number into agriculture, because land reform and the break up of the large estates provided peasant holdings. At the same time the planned industrial growth has called for labor in increasing quantities. The high level of employment has not been matched by a correspondingly high level of personal incomes and welfare. Life in the Democratic Republic has been bleak and cheerless. Even in East Berlin, the show-place of East Germany, consumers' goods are notably lacking in the shops and relatively little progress has been made in clearing the rubble of war and rebuilding the damaged buildings. Yet capital investment in new industrial undertakings has been heavy. Factory growth, especially in Saxony, has been rapid in recent years, and the rate of capital investment has been high. The iron, steel, chemical and fuel and power industries have been expanded. Ties have been established with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. A petroleum pipe-line is being built from the Ural region; navigation on the Oder from Upper Silesia is being improved, and East Germany has established itself as the most industrially developed of the satellites of the Soviet Union.

The German Democratic Republic has received diplomatic recognition from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in turn has recognized the legality and permanence of the boundaries established at the end of the Second World War. Yet despite these outward indications of friendship and trust, the boundary between the Democratic Republic and its eastern neighbors is only a degree less tightly sealed than that between it and the Federal Republic. There are only two recognized crossing points between East Germany and Poland.

Despite protestations by the Federal Republic, East Germany is in fact a sovereign state, or at least as sovereign as a Soviet satel-

sphere gives it an independence of action toward the West. Yet there continues to be a small volume of trade between East and West Germany. East Germany still uses steel, bituminous coal and chemicals from the West, and it supplies brown coal and agricultural produce to West Berlin. But the Democratic Republic may be moving rapidly toward the point where even this slight dependence on the West is no longer necessary.

BERLIN

West Germany is not so independent of East. It has to rely upon East Germany for access to Berlin. The origins of Berlin's peculiar status have already been examined earlier. The breakdown of quadripartite rule of the city, the hardening of the West-East sector boundary and the absorption of the Eastern or Soviet Sector of the city into the Democratic Republic have been mentioned. Western Berlin, made up of the American, British and French sectors, is a small area of only 186 square miles with a population of about 2,226,000, of whom about 8 per cent are refugees. Agriculture is insignificant in West Berlin; there are no sources of fuel or minerals, and the industrial labor force of roughly 400,000 has to use materials and fuel imported from West Germany or purchased in East, and to export the finished products to West Germany. Raw materials and foodstuffs obtained from East Germany are a small but important contribution. The industries of West Berlin are necessarily relatively high cost producers, and the city has to be subsidized by the Federal Republic and, though less directly, by the western forces of occupation.

Agreement between the occupying powers in 1945 provided for access to West Berlin from the British and American zones of occupation. The agreement was far from unambiguous, partly because the situation was thought to be only temporary. In 1948 the Russians cut the surface routes into the city and forced the western powers to use a costly air-lift to break the blockade. In 1949 a fresh agreement with the Soviet occupation authorities provided for access to the western sector of the city and also for a limited commercial exchange between West and East Germany. Certain roads,

railroads and canals were to be made available for access from the Federal Republic to the western sector of Berlin, and three air-corridors were also specified for the use of the western powers. To-day this arrangement is constantly being threatened, but it continues in a general way to operate.

Politically the western sectors of Berlin together constitute a city, with a city government under the direction of a Burgomaster. The Federal Republic regards Berlin as a *Land* which has not yet been formally incorporated into the republic. It threatened to hold a token meeting of the *Bundestag*, or Federal Parliament, in Berlin, and the Social Democrats nominated Willi Brandt, the Burgomaster (mayor) of Berlin, as the Social Democratic candidate for the office of Chancellor of the Federal Republic.

There is considerable risk in such acts. If West Berlin is to be treated as part of the sovereign Federal Republic, the Soviet authorities may be permitted to inquire what the western occupation forces are doing there. West Berlin is militarily and economically highly vulnerable. Its glitter is a highly important object lesson to the East Germans; the sector boundary in Berlin had been the most important escape route from the Soviet sphere of Europe into the West until it was virtually closed, in August 1961, by the action of East German authorities; through Berlin percolates news of the communist satellites, and its survival despite continued Communist pressure is a prestige factor of undoubted importance. On the other hand, the financial cost of maintaining this oasis in Communist Europe is high; it could be overrun by Russian forces in a few minutes, and access to the city is fraught with the continual risk of incidents. The risk is ever present that the western powers might be obliged to maintain their supply routes to the city by force.

The Two Germanies and Their Neighbors

THE division of Germany was the work of the allied statesmen during the closing phases of the Second World War. At that time no obstacles were seen to the joint occupation of the country and to the reduction of both its military and industrial potential. Within a year or two, it was supposed, a treaty of peace would be negotiated, and a single, unified German state would be re-established, purged by war of its aggressiveness and disciplined by the educative process which the allies regarded themselves as competent to direct. This program was not fulfilled, and Germany found herself caught up in the web of two opposing power blocs vastly more extensive than those which had faced one another in 1939, and separated by an ideological rift more profound than that between Naziism and Democracy. The hardening of the internal boundaries of Germany; the development of the three major divisions in three separate economic directions has already been described. It remains only to see how each of the three has been absorbed into its own system of political alliances and economic relationships.

The reversal about 1948 of the policy of the western allies toward the part of Germany which they jointly controlled has become, with justice, the object of much cynical comment both within Germany and without. With the deepening of antagonism between the Soviet Union and the West, the program of dismantling was quietly pushed into reverse. The German level of industry was allowed to be exceeded for specific purposes, and within a few years even this piece of camouflage was removed. After 1955 the only

restrictions on the Federal Republic were those which it itself assumed.

Germany's western neighbors, notably France, had been inspired chiefly by fear of Germany's misuse of the power which she could command. This fear has not wholly evaporated; it has merely been overlaid by another and greater fear, that inspired by the communist bloc. Great Britain, while somewhat fearful of Germany as an industrial competitor, still tended to think, with J. M. Keynes, that an industrially developed Germany was a more desirable partner than one that was de-industrialized, demoralized and poor.

The first invitation to West Germany to join with her western neighbors in a program of recovery was made by General George Marshall in 1947. From 1949, the Federal Republic was itself a member of the resulting Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Unquestionably the economic recovery of Germany during the following years was immeasurably indebted to American initiative on this occasion. The implementation of the Marshall Plan was shortly followed in 1950 by Schuman's proposal to form a common market in coal and the raw materials and part-finished products of the iron and steel industries. The European Coal and Steel Community came into being in 1952, after the ratification of the treaty between its members. West Germany, the biggest producer of both coal and steel in Western Europe, was from the start the most important member. The removal of restrictions and restraints on trade between the members in certain commodities at once removed the basis for certain French complaints against Germany's discrimination in the sale of coal; it destroyed part of France's argument for retaining the Saarland, and of Germany's for holding up the project for canalizing the Mosel. The success of the Coal and Steel Community prepared the way for the negotiation of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community, both of which came into being on January 1st, 1958. The former extended the collaboration and co-operation between the Six to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; the latter, to the creation of a common market with

no barriers to trade within and a common tariff around the six member states.

This economic integration of the Federal Republic with her western neighbors was paralleled by a deepening political collaboration. The gradual relaxation of allied control following the Petersberg Agreement of 1949 prepared the way for West German membership in the Western European Union and the Council of Europe, organizations for the political association of the states of northwestern Europe and, after 1955, of NATO itself.

It must not be assumed that the Germans themselves were unanimous in the welcome they gave to the change of policy among the western allies. A few years before, they had been declared unfit to have arms; now they found weapons being pushed into their hands. But the German people, who only recently had idealized the military, now had misgivings about militarism. The Second World War had brought home to them the realities of defeat and invasion. It was obvious that they were no longer the dominant military power in Europe, and the pursuit of militarism in the service of others did not appeal to them. Yet they could not wholly dissociate themselves from the cold war. On the one hand, they were too deeply indebted and committed to the West; on the other, there was always the possibility that force might be needed to reunite the splintered German state. Twelve million refugees spoke unanimously for a militarily strong West Germany. By no other instrument could they foresee the reconquest of their lost homelands in the East.

THE EASTERN BLOC

While West Germany was being integrated both politically and economically with Western Europe, a similar process was taking place in East Germany. Step by step, actions in the West were paralleled by those in the East, and the Democratic Republic was established alongside the Federal. The Council of Economic Mutual Assistance was established in 1949 by the Soviet Union and its East Europe satellites. It fulfilled the roles of NATO and OEEC, though the Soviet Union was very far from imitating the generous part played by the United States in the latter. To this body East Germany was admitted. It was the announced object of the Council

to secure a "broad economic cooperation" between members of the bloc. In fact it did far more than this. Its object was to co-ordinate programs of industrial development, to establish priorities, and to arrange for the supply and transportation of goods between the member nations. A certain latitude was left to the member states to make trading arrangements, but these were in the main bi-lateral barter agreements, negotiated mainly with other members of the Bloc. In any event the volume of trade increased between East Germany and her neighbors in the communist bloc, especially Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Few industrialized countries are more dependent than East Germany on imports for the supply of basic industrial materials. This has led both to a considerable dependence on synthetic materials and to reliance on trade within the bloc. East Germany today carries on a much larger volume of its total trade with the communist countries than either Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary. In 1958 East Germany sold 75 per cent of its exports to the bloc countries, "so that its fortunes are particularly linked, for some time to come, with the trading policies of these countries."²³

East Germany is integrated more closely with her fellow members of the eastern bloc than is West Germany with the countries of Western Europe. In a planned economy there is no provision for alternative courses of action. West Germany *could* withdraw from the Common Market with the possibility of finding alternative outlets for her exports. The rigidity of commercial organization of the eastern bloc permits East Germany no such freedom.

In the political field, East Germany has a similar rigidity in her relationship to her partners in the eastern bloc. The rulers of the Democratic Republic are conspicuously the puppets of the Kremlin, and the country which they rule is firmly occupied by Soviet forces.

WEST-, MITTEL- UND OST-DEUTSCHLAND

In some circles in West Germany it is fashionable to refer to the Democratic Republic as Central Germany, or *Mittel-Deutschland*, reserving for the lands taken by Poland the name East Ger-

²³ United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. XI, no. 1, 1959, p. 49.

many, or *Ost-Deutschland*. The Democratic Republic has formally accepted the boundary which now follows the rivers Oder and Neisse and makes no claim, either formal or implied, on the territory of Poland.

West Germany has twelve million refugees, most of whom have come from areas now under Polish or Czechoslovak rule. It would be unnatural if they did not hope sometime to return to the fields and farms which they abandoned, and no doubt the ancestral home grows more romantic and appealing as it recedes in time. How urgent is this homing instinct? Does it do anything more than focus the vague feelings of hostility that are present in many Germans toward the Slavs? The Federal Republic does not have diplomatic representation with Poland and does not formally recognize the Oder-Neisse boundary. In other words, it does not deny to its refugee citizens the hope that they may ultimately return, and occasionally an ill-judged remark by a minister or official gives some encouragement that these hopes may be fulfilled.

But about a quarter of the total refugee population came from Czechoslovakia, not from Poland, and the possibility of recovering the Sudetenland also for Germany must not be excluded from their hopes and plans. Demands, hitherto unofficial, for the restoration of the lost territories are as vain as Egyptian cries for the extinction of the state of Israel, or Irish for the ending of partition. There is no possibility in the foreseeable future that such a policy could be realized without a major war which would result in the destruction of the object sought. But it is difficult to persuade an emotional people that this is so. It is equally difficult to convince a sizeable body of refugees that they never had it so good as they do at present in West Germany and that a return east would be accompanied by a lowering of at least their material standards.

Yet refugee societies and parties exist all over West Germany, and at least a dozen centers of higher education devote space, time and money to the study of the German East, always with at least one eye on demonstrating the alleged injustice of handing this area over to the Slavs. One hopes that, as material standards improve,

this homing instinct will evaporate. Under present conditions these revisionist aims are clearly not realizable.

But in Poland and Czechoslovakia this clamor is viewed in a different light. The evidence of a neo-Nazi movement is magnified and made more meaningful than perhaps it is. Ill-considered statements by government ministers to gatherings of refugees, and even the harmless action of Chancellor Adenauer, in allowing himself to be photographed in the cloak and insignia of a Teutonic Knight, serve to add fuel to the fires of resentment and hostility in the East.

Such argument as this book has contained can be summarized in this way. The division of Germany is so complete and the zonal boundary so strong that no change can be foreseen as long as present conditions—that is, the Cold War—last. No change in these conditions is in sight, and we should accustom ourselves to the fact that we have two sovereign states in Germany instead of one. Lastly, the “lost” lands of the east could not be regained as long as Germany itself remains divided, and their recovery therefore is not a matter of practical policies.

Berlin, however, presents a different and more difficult problem. The situation here sprang in part from too optimistic a view in 1945 of the likelihood of the continuance of an effective alliance between West and East; in part from a looseness and lack of foresight in working out the detail of the Berlin enclave and its communications with the West. West Berlin is costly to maintain and militarily untenable. Keeping open its supply lines might at any time provoke an incident. Yet its citizens have demonstrated great loyalty to the cause of the free world; it serves as listening post, and as a symbol of a better and a freer world. This situation, which arose from the errors and misjudgments in allied policy at the end of the war, cannot easily be rectified. West Berlin cannot under present conditions be abandoned. It has unfortunately become a symbol, which means that values have come to be attached to it which have no necessary relation either to it or to the realities of political power.

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Appendix: Statistics

AREA AND POPULATION

<i>Federal Republic of Germany:</i>	<i>Area (Sq Km)</i>	<i>Population (1958)</i>
Länder: Schleswig-Holstein	15,657	2,275,800
Hamburg	714	1,807,600
Lower Saxony	47,382	6,515,600
Bremen	404	677,500
North Rhine-Westphalia	33,960	15,459,300
Hessen	21,108	4,651,500
Rhineland-Palatinate	19,829	3,354,700
Baden-Württemberg	35,750	7,433,000
Bavaria	70,549	9,278,000
Saarland	2,567	1,040,200
Berlin, Western sectors	481	2,226,000
	<hr/> 248,434	<hr/> 56,719,200
<i>German Democratic Republic:</i>		
Districts: Rostock	7,068	827,697
Schwerin	8,620	630,477
Neubrandenburg	10,918	662,526
Potsdam	12,413	1,172,902
Frankfurt-on-Oder	7,049	658,240
Cottbus	8,208	802,740
Magdeburg	11,525	1,392,085
Halle	8,765	1,984,034
Erfurt	7,306	1,257,370
Gera	3,994	728,145
Suhl	3,853	544,267
Dresden	6,740	1,895,669
Leipzig	4,964	1,534,605
Karl-Marx-Stadt	6,008	2,130,597
Berlin, Eastern Sector	403	1,090,353
	<hr/> 107,834	<hr/> 17,311,707

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

	Germany, 1938	Federal Republic (1953)	Democratic Republic (1953)
Cropland (sq km)		81,130	49,212
Meadow and pasture (sq km)		56,865	12,995
Forest (sq km)		71,027	29,350
Wheat (thousands of metric tons)	5,578	3,693	1,363
Rye (" " " ")	8,606	3,728	2,368
Barley (" " " ")	4,248	2,412	931
Oats (" " " ")	6,366	2,149	1,143
Potatoes (" " " ")	50,894	22,678	11,498

PRODUCTION OF COAL, IRON, STEEL,
AND PETROLEUM

(In thousands of metric tons)

	Germany, 1938	Federal Republic (1953)	Democratic Republic (1953)
Coal, bituminous	171,789	133,582	2,903
Brown coal (lignite)	192,686	93,765	214,970
Crude petroleum	552	4,432	—
Iron ore (metal content)	3,360	4,132	395
Pig iron	18,044	16,755	1,775
Crude steel	22,656	22,785	3,043

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